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AInternational Law and the Transformation of War,
1899–1949: The Case of Military Occupation
Jonathan Gumz
University of BirminghamSeptember 11, 2001, heralded a new age of war according to many Western se-
curity experts. Nonuniformed and non-state-sanctioned combatants attacked the
World Trade Center to sow terror at the heart of the West. According to the Bush
administration, the radically new nature of this war demanded indeﬁnite deten-
tion and “enhanced” interrogation for those captured by the United States. Ad-
ministration supporters vigorously defended thesemeasures, often using the con-
ﬂict’s novelty as a justiﬁcation.1
International legal and human rights communities erupted in protest. Indef-
initely detaining persons without civilian trial, denying them civilian legal
counsel, brutally interrogating them, trying them in front of hazily constituted
“military commissions,” and interning them in a legal no-man’s land at Guan-
tánamo Naval Base were attempts to ﬁght this conﬂict outside international
law’s reach. Criminal law provided methods to deal with Al-Qaeda. The Bush
administration’s methods were unnecessary, counterproductive to US interests,
and illegal. This new war could be fought within the conﬁnes of international
law, administration opponents assured the world.2
This war’s novelty was the one area of agreement in this intense debate. Yet,
some of these issues from the post-9/11 era hearkened back to discussions of
military occupation from the late nineteenth century through the mid-twentiethThe Journal of Modern History 90 (September 2018): 621–660
© 2018 by The University of Chicago. 0022-2801/2018/9003-0004$10.00
All rights reserved.
1 See, e.g., Shannon D. Beebe and Mary H. Kaldor, The Ultimate Weapon Is No
Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace (New York, 2010); Mary
Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 3rd ed. (Stanford, CA,
2012).
2 For examples from opposing sides, see John Yoo and James Ho, “The Status of
Terrorists,” Boalt Working Papers in Public Law, http://escholarship.org/uc/item
/7kt6n5zf; Ann-Marie Slaughter and William Burke-White, “An International Constitu-
tional Moment,” Harvard International Law Journal 22 (2002): 1–22. The key legal
texts for the Bush administration’s approach were Jay S. Bybee, “Memorandum for
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, General Coun-
sel of the Department of Defense,” January 22, 2002, and Alberto R. Gonzales, “Mem-
orandum for the President,” January 25, 2002, in The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu
Ghraib, ed. Karen L. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (Cambridge, 2005), 81–117, 118–
25.
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622 Gumz
Acentury. Those discussions revolved around subjects such as the limits of resis-
tance and the qualiﬁcations for belligerent status. The late nineteenth century
witnessed the codiﬁcation of military occupation in international law. But by
1949, the consensus on which this codiﬁcation was built had disappeared.
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 conﬁrmed the transformation of the late nine-
teenth century’s vision of occupation. They solidiﬁed the category of the resis-
tance ﬁghter in an occupation, inscribing it into the landscape of the legitimate
in war. This was part of a broader change in the European conception of war,
one that departed from what Carl Schmitt characterized as “contained war.”
Contained war accepted the right of states to prosecute wars, but it sought to
reduce the possibility of escalation by controlling and limiting wars once they
had begun. Such wars were always to have limited, discrete goals. Those who
conducted war were to be European sovereign states, most notably European
great powers; civilians were to be separated from the conﬂict, and any expan-
sion of belligerent status was viewed with suspicion. The memory of the Na-
poleonic wars, as David A. Bell argues, played a critical role in shaping a com-
mitment to contained war in the nineteenth century.3 It was also a conception of
war closely linked to the notion of “civilization” in nineteenth-century interna-
tional politics insofar as it was geographically limited to Europe and a few other
select regions in the world.4 We know that outside this circle of civilization in
the colonial world, European armies along with others, such as the US Army,
pursued wars where violence was routinely and purposefully directed against
civilians. One need only look to the US war in the Philippines, the actions of
the French General Hubert Lyautey, or the writings of the British General
Charles Calwell to ﬁnd examples of how unrestricted warfare reared its head
outside the charmed circle of “civilization.”5 Schmitt deployed his notion of3 David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as
We Know It (New York, 2007), 308–9. For other historians and political scientists who
make arguments relating to “contained conﬂict” in the nineteenth century, see Michael
Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of MachineWarfare, 1914–1945,” inMakers of Mod-
ern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1986),
535; Geyer, “The Past as Future: The GermanOfﬁcer Corps as Profession,” in TheGerman
Professions: 1800–1950, ed. Geoffrey Cocks and Konrad Jarausch (Oxford, 1990), 197;
Jörn Leonhard, Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs (Munich,
2014), 22.
4 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (Oxford,
1984).
5 Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial
Warfare,” inMakers of Modern Strategy: FromMachiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter
Paret (Princeton, NJ, 1986), 376–407; Daniel Whittingham, “‘Savage Warfare:’ C. E.
Callwell, the Roots of Counter-Insurgency, and the 19th Century Context,” Small Wars
and Insurgencies 23, nos. 4–5 (2012): 591–607; Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine
War, 1899–1902 (Lawrence, KS, 2000).
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Transformation of the European Conception of War 623
Acontained war in an attack on the post–World War I Versailles order, but this
does not diminish the concept’s usefulness as a characterization of the Euro-
pean approach to war in the nineteenth century. This article argues that con-
tained war was the broader norm that rested behind military occupation as cod-
iﬁed in international law. The road from the late nineteenth century’s vision of
military occupation in international law to Geneva’s treatment of occupation
was anything but straightforward, and this essay will trace the contingent pro-
cess that led to occupation’s transformation at Geneva.
Various disciplines have examined military occupation. Historians have pro-
duced detailed studies, in particular for World War II. Yet, historians are less
interested in occupation as a speciﬁcally international phenomenon whose his-
torical construction is bound up with international law and norms.6 Political sci-
entists, by contrast, concentrate on assumptions within the international system
that shape occupation. David Edelstein maintains that the international threat
environment around an occupation decisively inﬂuences its success or failure.7
Tanisha Fazal contends that a norm against conquest arose with American pre-
eminence after 1945 and contributed to the absence of “state death” in the pe-
riod afterward.8 Yet, such arguments lend too much clarity to very muddled
conceptions of postwar norms, especially insofar as we follow the works of his-
torians such as Mark Mazower and Samuel Moyn.9 Mazower’s and Moyn’s
perspectives also challenge contemporary legal scholarship. Much of the cur-
rent literature on the law of occupation is partially informed by the corpus of
contemporary human rights law and legal developments after 1945. The as-
sumptions embedded in that corpus unnecessarily limit a historical approach
to the law of occupation. The standard contemporary legal argument empha-
sizes that prior to 1945, the laws of war afforded civilians few protections
and overprivileged the state. The Second World War made clear the need for
change, including a change in the law of occupation.10 Some legal scholars por-6 An exception to this is Mark Mazower, who includes the National Socialist ap-
proach to international law in his analysis of National Socialist occupation. See Mark
Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York, 2008), 354,
586–87.
7 David M. Edelstein, Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occu-
pation (Ithaca, NY, 2008). See also the H-Diplo Roundtable on Edelstein’s book at
http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-X-15.pdf.
8 Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupa-
tion, and Annexation (Princeton, NJ, 2007).
9 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA, 2010),
47–48; Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological
Origins of the United Nations (Princeton, NJ, 2009), 7–19.
10 See, e.g., Jochen Abr. Frowein, “The Relationship between Human Rights Re-
gimes and Regimes of Belligerent Occupation,” Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights
28 (1998): 1–28.
This content downloaded from 147.188.108.168 on October 04, 2018 06:40:52 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
624 Gumz
Atray occupation as unworkable, especially when it comes to the “conservationist
principle” that prohibits the occupier from transforming an occupied society.11
Others, most notably Eyal Benvenisti, have dealt with the origins of belligerent
occupation, but their investigations have tended to be narrowly legal and have
made little attempt to place occupation law in a deeper historical context. Finally,
legal approaches have little room for the sharp breaks created by contingency.12
Legal scholarship is certainly important to understanding the law of occupation,
but the most important legal scholarship comes from the period from the late nine-
teenth century to the mid-1950s.
This article seeks to examine the law of occupation looking forward from its
position within the late nineteenth-century European norm of contained war,
not backward from contemporary international law. When it was codiﬁed, the
law of military occupation was closely connected to the norm of war contain-
ment within the realm of “civilization,” but that connection was severed by 1949.
Reaching this point requires the examination of fourmoments in occupation’s his-
tory from the late nineteenth century through 1949. The ﬁrst arose with the cod-
iﬁcation of military occupation at the Hague Conference of 1899; the next came
with the National Socialist assault on the codiﬁed law of occupation; the third
came in the Hostages Trial of 1947–48, when high-ranking Wehrmacht defen-
dants sought to reframe National Socialist occupation practices within the law
of occupation codiﬁed at The Hague in 1899; and the fourth arrived with the Ge-
neva Conference of 1949 and its preparatory conferences. In this last instance the
American and British defense of the norm of contained war and the law of occu-
pation faced a broad European reaction against occupation. That reaction trans-
formed key elements of the law of occupation such as the status of resistanceﬁght-
ers, severing occupation’s links with the norm of contained war.
Codifying Military Occupation
Discussions of military occupation at The Hague were part of an attempt to cod-
ify a range of customary international law (CIL) in the late nineteenth century.11 See, e.g., Davis Goodman, “The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law of Bel-
ligerent Occupation,” Stanford Law Review 37, no. 6 (July 1985): 1573–1608. For Iraq,
see Gregory H. Fox, “The Occupation of Iraq,” Georgetown Journal of International
Law 36, no. 2 (Winter 2005): 195–297; David Scheffer, “Beyond Occupation Law,”
American Journal of International Law 97, no. 4 (October 2003): 842–60; Adam Rob-
erts, “Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human
Rights,”American Journal of International Law 100, no. 3 (July 2006): 580–622; Ginesh
Sitaraman, “Counterinsurgency, War on Terror, and the Laws of War,” Virginia Law Re-
view 95, no. 7 (November 2009): 1748.
12 Eyal Benvenisti, “The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation,” Law
and History Review 26, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 621–48.
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AThe developing profession of international law, Europe’s recently professional-
ized ofﬁcer corps, and, of course, diplomats were the most active participants in
this process. Alongside treaty law, CIL is the main building block of inter-
national law. CIL is derived from international declarations, diplomatic corre-
spondence, and legal scholarship. State practice proceeding out of an explicit
sense of legal obligation also constitutes CIL, but proving this subjective sense
of legal obligation is often very difﬁcult. In a critique of CIL, Eric Posner and
Jack Goldsmith argue that it lacks a “centralized lawmaker, a centralized exec-
utive enforcer, and a centralized authoritative decision maker.”13 Michael Byers
describes CIL as part of the “normative structures that regulate the application
of what international relations scholars call ‘power.’”14 The fact that elements
of CIL are not clearly deﬁned means that tensions appear in sharper relief once
the codiﬁcation of CIL begins. That is exactly what happened at The Hague in
1899 when it came to military occupation. The tensions surrounded three ques-
tions. First, when and how was an occupation established and maintained?
Second, what was the relationship between the departed sovereign state, the
municipal authorities, and the occupying power? Third, was resistance to an es-
tablished military occupation legal?
Delegates at The Hague ﬁrst focused on the establishment and maintenance
of military occupation. The legal shorthand for this is “effectiveness.” German
and Russian military delegates expressed concern that an uprising could de-
establish an occupation if it cut an occupying force’s lines of communication.
Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, the German military delegate, wanted a por-
tion of the Brussels Declaration of 1874, the basis of the discussions at The
Hague, stricken entirely. It read: “Territory is considered occupied when it is
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends
only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be ex-
ercised.”15 Schwarzhoff was concerned about the effort required to maintain
an occupation and the implications of not “exercising” authority consistently.
Édouard Rolin-Jacquemyns suggested they borrow from the 1880 Oxford Man-
ual of the Laws of War on Land, which stated that an occupation was estab-
lished once the invaded state “has actually ceased to exercise its ordinary au-
thority therein.” Others feared that striking a sentence that emphasized the
“exercising” of an occupier’s authority or referring to a loss of “authority”13 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric Posner, “ATheory of Customary International Law,”
University of Chicago Law Review 66, no. 4 (Autumn 1999): 1114–15.
14 Michael Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rule: International Relations
and Customary International Law (Cambridge, 1999), 4.
15 “On Military Authority over a Hostile Territory,” Article 1, International Declara-
tion Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, Brussels, August 27, 1874, https://www
.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action5openDocument&documentId5337371
A4C94194E8C12563CD005154B1.
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Awould make it easy to declare an occupation in the midst of conducting an in-
vasion. One could create “paper” occupations, much like “paper” blockades,
turning a legal military defense against an invasion into an illegal uprising
against an occupation. After much debate, the delegates decided to adopt with-
out any alteration the ﬁrst article of the Brussels Declaration of 1874 regarding
the start of an occupation. The German and Russian delegates dropped their ob-
jections.16
Though the Brussels Declaration was a central element in CIL, the discus-
sion over this article also revealed contrasting understandings of the legal basis
for military occupation. Was military occupation grounded in the force of the
occupier alone, and if so, did that force have to be exercised consistently across
occupied territory? This had implications for the relationship between the oc-
cupier and the occupied population. If force was the basis of obedience, it in-
creased demands on the occupier to “exercise” control over an occupied territory
constantly. In turn, an occupier could more easily lose its claim to occupation,
which would increase the possibilities for legitimate resistance to a de-established
occupation. If, however, the occupier’s authority rested in international law, the
need for a continuous “exercise” of control diminished and the occupier could
make claims on the occupied population’s obedience with reference to interna-
tional law.
Local law would continue to apply in an occupied territory because this
helped maintain the assertion that the defeated government was still sovereign
in that occupied territory. The occupier was only a trustee for the departed sov-
ereign. The Brussels Declaration created a delicate balance. It allowed the local
administration of a territory under military occupation to remain in place and
restrained the occupier’s power to “modify, suspend, or replace” local laws “un-
less necessary.”17 In her analysis of this discussion of the administration of oc-
cupied territory, Isabel V. Hull has focused on the insistence by Schwarzhoff
and the Russian military delegate, Colonel J. Gilinsky, that local laws not take
precedence over “order” and the military law of the occupant.18 This issue was dis-
cussed, but Auguste Beernaert, a former Belgian prime minister and a Belgian
delegate, instigated the most heated arguments on local administration. He
wanted to drop all references to the occupier enforcing local laws and working
with the local administration. Beernaert believed these articles granted the oc-
cupying power too many rights and thought it dangerous that such clauses16 See the discussion in Seventh Meeting, Second Subcommission, June 8, 1899, in
James Scott, ed., The Proceedings of The Hague Peace Conferences: The Conference of
1899 (New York, 1920), 509–12.
17 Article 3, Brussels Declaration, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/135?Open
Document.
18 Isabel V. Hull, A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the
Great War (Ithaca, NY, 2015), 97–98.
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Asought to anchor the relationship between occupier and occupied in interna-
tional law. “We cannot,” he declared, “transform fact into law.” Yet, Beernaert
failed to convince other delegates at The Hague. The articles that Beernaert op-
posed, several pointed out, were in the Brussels Declaration precisely to re-
strain the occupier, even if few at the time foresaw how the German Army
would invoke a robust doctrine of military necessity to evade such restraints
in World War I. Even Schwarzhoff spoke up for these articles, arguing that peo-
ple needed their local ofﬁcials to remain in place during occupation. Feodor
Martens, the Russian delegate and one of the most respected jurists at the con-
ference, objected to Beernaert’s attempt to ground occupation in force alone.
For Martens, occupation was situated within international law, and laying out
the “rights and duties” of the occupier and the defeated government was essen-
tial. Leaving occupation as vague as possible in international law provided the
occupied with little protection from the occupier.19
Most of the articles concerning local administration made it into the Hague
Conventions of 1899, and Beernaert’s attempt to push law forward, de lege
ferenda, was largely resisted. Making the occupier a trustee for the departed
sovereign government and requiring it to uphold local laws prevented the oc-
cupier from transforming the occupied territory through changes in its institu-
tions and laws, maintaining the defeated state’s sovereignty.20 Keeping the local
administration and laws intact distinguished occupation from conquest. The as-
surance of continued sovereignty and nontransformation also gave defeated
governments an incentive not to ﬁght past the point of defeat.21 Thus, sover-
eignty and the norm of contained conﬂict were mutually reinforcing. Only a
peace treaty could transfer sovereignty. Practically speaking, these measures
also sought to restore a state of order and nonwar in an occupied territory.
With some minor modiﬁcations, the decisions on “effectiveness” in occupa-
tion and local administration remained largely within the bounds of CIL. They
hewed closely to important international legal documents such as the Brussels
Declaration while taking on additions from the Oxford Manual. State practice
with regard to occupation was raised only in the abstract, in connection with19 See Speech of Auguste Beernaert, June 6, 1899, in Scott, The Proceedings, 503;
Remark by Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, June 10, 1899, in Scott, The Proceedings,
521; Speech by Feodor Martens, June 6, 1899, in Scott, The Proceedings, 506.
20 “Transformation” refers in a legal sense to the deliberate, long-term reworking of
the institutions and laws of the occupied territory by the occupier, as opposed to what
has been called a “trustee” occupation. See Nehal Bhuta, “The Antinomies of a Trans-
formative Occupation,” European Journal of International Law 16, no. 4 (2005): 721–
40.
21 This was the lesson of the Franco-Prussian War. See Michael Howard, The Franco-
Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870–1871 (London, 1961), 371; Mark
Stoneman, “The Bavarian Army and French Civilians in theWar of 1870–1871: ACultural
Interpretation,” War in History 8, no. 3 (July 2001): 271–93.
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Aassumptions about what militaries, governments, and people might do in a hy-
pothetical situation; references to military manuals or actual instances of state
practice were absent. Moving in and out of these discussions, sometimes very
obliquely, was the third and most volatile question: the legality of resistance.
When the British military delegate, Sir John Ardagh, and the Swiss military del-
egate, Colonel Arnold Künzli, put forth proposals to legalize resistance to an
established occupation, the discussion entered new and dangerous territory.
As usual, the discussion was based on relevant articles from the Brussels Dec-
laration. Those articles read:
Article 9: The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia
and volunteer corps fulﬁlling the following conditions:
1. That they be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. That they have a ﬁxed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. That they carry arms openly; and
4. That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.In countries where militia constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under
the denomination “army.”
Article 10: The population of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the ap-
proach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without
having had time to organize themselves in accordance with Article 9, shall be regarded
as belligerents if they respect the laws and customs of war.22
These articles applied to resistance to an invading army, not resistance to an
established occupation, but they offered an opening to discuss resistance to oc-
cupation. Earlier, Beernaert had wanted these articles abolished. “By undertak-
ing to restrict war to States only, the citizens remaining to a certain extent only
mere spectators,” asked Beernaert, “would not the risk be run of reducing the
factors of resistance by weakening the powerful mainspring of patriotism?”
Discouraging civilians from ﬁghting “either before or after occupation” encour-
aged “baneful indifference” among Europe’s populace. Ardagh recommended a
concrete amendment: “Nothing in this chapter shall be considered as tending to
lessen or abolish the right belonging to the population of an invaded country to
fulﬁll its duty of offering by all lawful means, the most energetic patriotic re-
sistance against the invaders.” Künzli suggested an addition: “No acts of retal-
iation shall be exercised against the population of the occupied territory for hav-
ing openly taken up arms against the invader.” Though the distinction between22 Articles 9 and 10, Brussels Declaration, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf
/ART/135-70009?OpenDocument.
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Transformation of the European Conception of War 629
Ainvasion and occupation is clear in the Hague Convention of 1899, the dividing
line between the two was blurred at times in the discussions.23 This further dem-
onstrated the importance of “effective” occupation, since an occupation that
was not “effective” slipped back into a more permissive set of regulations when
it came to resistance.24
Suggestions that civilians could ﬁght as legitimate combatants against estab-
lished occupations provoked vigorous responses from Schwarzhoff and Gil-
insky. Schwarzhoff declared that he could go no further than allowing for a le-
vée en masse (general uprising of the population) against an invader, suggested
that restrictions (carrying weapons openly and wearing a distinctive sign) might
be placed on such resistance, but then, “in the spirit of conciliation,” offered no
amendments along these lines. Schwarzhoff also wanted to know why Ardagh’s
addition was necessary. Did it not repeat what was already in Articles 9 and 10?
Was there some ulterior motive behind this, pointing in the direction of resis-
tance to an established occupation? Gilinsky was even more direct. “The inhab-
itants who ﬁght openly in an unoccupied territory,” Gilinsky maintained, “are
recognized as belligerents.” But, he went on, “this right cannot be granted to
the inhabitants of an occupied territory who attack the lines of communication
[of an army].”25
That professional military delegates advanced these arguments was unsur-
prising. They were determined to isolate civilians from war, uphold clear lines
between civilians and soldiers, and maintain stability during an occupation.
Ardagh’s intervention remained an odd element in this context. Ardagh was the
Director of Military Intelligence in the British Army and had fought in the Boer
War. His preconferencememorandum largely conformed to the norm of contained
conﬂict. Occupation ended conﬂict. The power of contemporary armies already
made civilian resistance to an invader “useless and futile.”26 Concerned about
smaller countries such as Belgium, he considered Beernaert’s proposal to conﬁne
occupation to the realm of “the law of nations” a misguided one.27 At best, this23 This distinction is made very clear in the work of one of the leading Israeli legal
scholars of occupation. See Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Oc-
cupation (Cambridge, 2009), 38.
24 Speech of Auguste Beernaert, June 6, 1899, Proposals by Sir John Ardagh and the
Swiss Delegation, June 20, 1899, in Scott, The Proceedings, 504, 550.
25 Remarks by Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff and Colonel J. Gilinsky, June 20,
1899, in Scott, The Proceedings, 552–53.
26 Kew, Public Record Ofﬁce (PRO), PRO 30/40/15, Personal Papers of Sir John
Ardagh, Ardagh to Lansdowne, “Draft of Instructions for the Peace Conference, 1899,”
undated.
27 PRO, FO 881/7473, Pauncefote to Salisbury, Enclosure: Sir John Ardagh, “Bel-
gian Objections at the Conference to Articles IX and X of the Declaration of Brussels,”
July 27, 1899.
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Awould mean leaving occupation open to the differing interpretations of CIL that
were now emerging at The Hague. Others could have argued that this simply
meant conﬁning occupation to the realm of war with minimal rules. Ardagh also
worried about the growing size of European armies, and his preconference
memorandum contained charts detailing the British Army’s inferiority vis-à-vis
its continental counterparts. He noted that without conscription Britain could
never catch up to those armies. (Here it is worth remembering the British policy-
making establishment’s sense of broader strategic weakness at the turn of the
century.) And while Ardagh offered support for the Belgian position on resis-
tance to occupation, that support reﬂected Britain’s approach to international
law: it wanted to play along but also keep an exemption for itself in reserve.
But it was more than just the German and Russian delegates who found the
ideas of Beernaert, Künzli, and Ardagh dangerous. Feodor Martens had tried to
head off this confrontation several weeks earlier and now stepped in again. The
centerpiece of his intervention became known as the Martens clause. It read:
“Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and
empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the laws of hu-
manity and the requirements of the public conscience.”28 This is the Martens we
know, or at least want to know. It is the Martens of great foresight and humanity
who deposits a clause inside theHague Conventions that will later provide a legal
basis for the post-1945 international legal order. Viewed through the lens of mil-
itary occupation, however, the Martens who proposed this clause was someone
quite different. Phrases such as “the public conscience,”Antonio Cassese argues,
were adopted precisely because their meaning was opaque. He calls the impor-
tance later attached to the Martens clause a “legal myth of the international com-
munity.”29 TheMartens clause was certainly not an attempt to provide legitimacy
for resistance movements in occupied territories, as some later argued.30 Mar-
tens’s intervention was directed toward ensuring that the Hague conference cod-
iﬁed CIL in treaty form and went beyond the mere declaration that emerged from28 See “Preamble,” Convention with Regard to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, July 29, 1899, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/150-110001?OpenDocument.
29 Antonio Cassese, “The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?,”
European Journal of International Law 11, no. 1 (2000): 187–216. For a similar assess-
ment, see Mark Mazower, Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the
Present (New York, 2012), 75. Even Geoffrey Best concedes that this might be the case.
See Geoffrey Best, “Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899 Hague
Conference and What Came After,” International Affairs 75, no. 3 (1999): 627–28.
30 Theodor Meron, “The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of the
Public Conscience,” American Journal of International Law 94, no. 1 (January 2000):
79.
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ABrussels in 1874.31 Martens also still maneuvered within the norm of contained
war, and his interventions around the law of occupation demonstrated this.
In a more sophisticated and elegant manner than either Schwarzhoff or
Gilinsky, Martens continually advocated linking military occupation with the
norm of contained conﬂict and undermined arguments put forward by Beer-
naert, Ardagh, and Künzli. Drawing on CIL, Martens praised the portions of
the Brussels Declaration and the Lieber Code that dealt with occupation.32
Law undergirded occupation in Martens’s argument, rather than force, as Beer-
naert maintained. If that lawwas not sufﬁciently codiﬁed at TheHague, the entire
international legal project might be called into question. Law restricted the power
of the occupier, ensuring the continued sovereignty of the defeated state, but it
also demanded obedience from the occupied population. Martins sketched out
an idea of reciprocal duties for occupier and occupied. The “duties” of both
the “strong” and the “weak,”Martens contended, had to be recognized. “It is im-
possible to compel the stronger to respect the rights of the weaker,”Martens de-
clared, “if the duties of the latter are not recognized.” Ignoring this would end up
“sacriﬁcing the vital interests of peaceful, unarmed populations to the risk of rea-
sons of war and the law of nations.” Leaving occupation to the “law of nations,”
as Beernaert wanted to do, left too many decisions to military commanders in a
frenzied and stressful wartime situation, with dreadful implications for the civil-
ian population. Martens also argued that governments could not prosecute war
past the point of defeat, as Beernaert had suggested. While the “population”
had a right to “defend themselves,” Martens believed that “no less sacred is the
duty of Governments not to sacriﬁce useless victims in the interest of war.”33 An-
choring military occupation in codiﬁed treaty law created an incentive to stop
ﬁghting.
But what should we make of Martens’s comment that the “population” had a
right to take part in conﬂict? In the case of occupation, the practical and human-
itarian elements of the international legal project seemed to argue against inter-
national sanction of such an uprising. Occupation forces would retaliate against
rebels as well as the wider population and the line between soldier and civilian
would blur. Yet, the commitment of Martens and others to a moderate nation-31 In this respect, see Baron Lambermont’s remark to the British Ambassador to Bel-
gium during preconference planning, PRO, FO 881/7473, F. Plunkett to Salisbury, Sep-
tember 4, 1898.
32 The Lieber Code was a set of regulations developed by Francis Lieber in 1863,
during the American Civil War, to govern the behavior of Union forces as they pressed
deeper into the Confederacy. Among other things, it was concerned with the question of
authority over enemy territory and property. See John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The
Laws of War in American History (New York, 2012), 231–49.
33 Speeches of Feodor Martens, June 6, 10, and 20, 1899, in Scott, The Proceedings,
505–8, 518, 547–49.
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Aalism led them to believe that an uprising against an occupation demonstrated a
nation’s vitality. “It is not our province . . . to set limits to patriotism,” Martens
noted; “our mission is simply to establish by common agreement among the
States the rights of the population and the conditions to be fulﬁlled by those
who desire legally to ﬁght for their country.” Such heroism, even if futile, Mar-
tens noted, could not be stopped by legal dictate. “A heroic nation,” he ex-
plained, “is, like heroes, above codes, rules, and facts.” Later, Martens stressed
that one could not “in codifying the laws and customs of war, . . . accomplish an
impossible task, namely: to codify the heroic acts of individuals or popula-
tions.”34 Such statements exempliﬁed an almost Mazzinian approach to nation-
alist resistance to occupation, one that anticipated its failure. It constructed a
heroic historical frame for potential resistance to occupation while denying it
legal sanction.
Knit within the broader norm of contained war, the law of occupation as it
emerged from The Hague found resonance among states, militaries, and the in-
ternational legal community. Within the realm of “civilization,” it stressed sov-
ereignty in occupied territories and considered occupiers trustees for departed
governments. The emphasis on sovereignty effectively cut out large portions
of the colonial world from occupation. The occupied owed the occupier obedi-
ence, while the occupier was to maintain the institutions and laws of the defeated
government. Occupation authorities could not introduce far-reaching legislation
or extract economic resources beyond what the occupation forces required. If not
explicitly illegal, resistance to an established occupation was risky in a broader
legal framework that expected obedience from the occupied population and re-
quired the local government to continue to function under occupation. This was,
in short, the notion of a nontransformative or trustee occupation, as it later be-
came known in international law literature.35 A range of international legal
scholars and military manuals from the United States and the United Kingdom
ﬁxed the duty of obedience to an occupier under a military occupation within
international law, while also emphasizing that the occupation had to remain
nontransformative and maintain the defeated state’s sovereignty.36 Of course,
this resonance was not found everywhere. At The Hague, the Germans appeared34 Speech of Feodor Martens, June 20, 1899, in Scott, The Proceedings, 547.
35 Allan Gerson, “Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israel’s Presence in the
West Bank,” Harvard Journal of International Law 14 (1978): 1–49; Conor McCarthy,
“The Paradox of the International Law of Military Occupation: Sovereignty and the Ref-
ormation of Iraq,” Journal of Conﬂict and Security Law 10, no. 1 (2005): 45–47.
36 Antoine Pillet, Les lois actuelles de la guerre (Paris, 1898), 200–209; Albéric Rolin,
Le droit moderne de la guerre. Les principes. Les conventions. Les usages et les abus,
2 vols. (Brussels, 1920), 1:429–30; US War Department, Rules of Land Warfare, FM 27-
10 (Washington, DC, 1940), 78; United Kingdom, War Ofﬁce, Manual of Military Law
(London, 1936), 72.
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Ato be committed defenders of a link between the law of occupation and the norm
of contained war. But as Isabel V. Hull has shown, within the German Army an
expansive notion of military necessity rooted in a growing existentialist sense of
conﬂict held the seeds of a dismissive approach toward international law.37 Other
explosive issues closely tied to occupation, such as the use of hostages to secure an
occupied population’s obedience, were passed over at The Hague, but they con-
tinued to be debated and discussed in circles concerned with international law
and military occupation.
National Socialist Germany and Occupation
The First World War buffeted the law of occupation and the norm of contained
conﬂict in Europe. Yet, individual transgressions of the Hague rules did not
equal wholesale repudiation of military occupation. The German Army pushed
occupation’s limits during its occupation of Belgium and Poland, but Germany
did not declare international law null and void. German occupation administra-
tions in places like Poland still cited the Hague Conventions, as Jesse Kauffman
notes.38 Though Austria-Hungary tested the boundaries of international law,
later in the war it attempted to align its behavior with the Hague Conventions
in the territories it occupied.39 In 1916 the Austrian Interior Ministry directed
ofﬁcials and the population in Dalmatia, a territory threatened by Italian inva-
sion, not to “carry on or organize any armed resistance” to potential Italian oc-
cupation.40 The various occupations that spread across Russia as that country
collapsed into civil war in late 1917, however, offered instances of occupations
amidst the near total collapse of internal authority. The results were not prom-
ising. Germany’s expansive aims in Eastern Europe, internal disorder in Russia,
and the appearance of nationalist states led to heavy-handed interventions on
behalf of allied states like Ukraine. But we should recognize that in the post-
Brest-Litovsk world these were interventions, not occupations in the Hague37 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in
Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY, 2005), 122–26, and Hull, A Scrap of Paper, 27, 45–47.
38 Jesse Kauffman, Elusive Alliance: The German Occupation during World War I
(Cambridge, MA, 2015), 61–62; Winson Chu, Jesse Kauffman, and Michael Meng, “A
Sonderweg through Eastern Europe? The Varieties of German Rule in Poland during
the Two World Wars,” German History 31, no. 3 (September 2013): 318–44.
39 Jonathan E. Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia,
1914–1918 (Cambridge, 2009), 105–41.
40 Vienna, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Allgemeine Verwaltungsarchiv, Innenmi-
nisterium—Präsidialreihe, k.k. Innenministerium to Statthalterei in Dalmatien, “Direk-
tive bezüglich des Verhaltens der Gemeinden und der Bevölkerung im Falle einer
feindlichen Okkupation,” March 8, 1916, Karton 1822.
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Asense.41 General Wilhelm Groener, the commander of German forces in Ukraine,
complained that the destruction of the local administration in the ongoing Civil
War precluded a proper military occupation.42 Groener’s remarks revealed how
the vision ofmilitary occupation codiﬁed at TheHague continued to shape visions
of occupation.
If World War I shook but did not break the law of occupation, National So-
cialist Germany threatened to obliterate it completely. The National Socialist
government was deeply hostile toward late nineteenth-century international law
and the vision of military occupation codiﬁed at The Hague. It rejected the
norm of contained war and the standard view of sovereignty that considered
states theoretical equals. What follows will examine the National Socialist in-
tellectual attack on late nineteenth-century international law, the consequences
for military occupation, and the repercussions for National Socialist occupation
regimes.
Initially, National Socialist Germany claimed that its aggressive foreign pol-
icy only represented an assertion of traditional sovereignty against the strictures
of the Versailles Treaty. Yet, this cynical strategy should not lead us to look past
how National Socialist legal thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, Werner Best, or Carl
Bilﬁnger persistently attacked the ideal of interstate equality embedded in sov-
ereignty and international law.43 This attack grew stronger in the late 1930s. At
its base, National Socialist legal thought contained a toxic brew of antagonism
toward liberalism and international law, a commitment to racial thinking, and a
belief in power as the determinant of international order. It could espouse ra-
cialized ideology and pose as hardheaded and realistic. Just as the domestic lib-
eral legal order was brushed aside, its international counterpart met with deep
skepticism. National Socialist legal thinkers viewed equality between sover-
eigns as similar to equality among individuals: they rejected both. “Sovereignty”
and “equality”were concepts, according to one National Socialist legal theorist,
connected to “liberalism.”44 Power and race made states unequal, and interna-
tional law and its emphasis on sovereignty distorted reality. “The differences of
the races, the foundation of the creation of the Volksgemeinschaft and the inter-41 Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order,
1916–1931 (New York, 2014), 124–38.
42 Wilhelm Groener, Lebenserinnerungen: Jugend, Generalstab, Weltkrieg (Göttin-
gen, 1957), 383–98.
43 On this argument and rearmament, see Gerhard L. Weinberg,Hitler’s Foreign Pol-
icy 1933–1939: The Road to World War II, rev. and corrected ed. (New York, 2010), 34–
35. Early analysis of National Socialist legal thought emphasized the centrality of sov-
ereignty; see Lawrence Preuss, “National Socialist Conceptions of International Law,”
American Political Science Review 29, no. 4 (August 1935): 597.
44 Norbert Gürke, “Grundzüge des Völkerrechts,” in Grundlagen, Aufbau, und Wirt-
schaftsordnung des nationalsozialistischen Staates (1936), 7.
This content downloaded from 147.188.108.168 on October 04, 2018 06:40:52 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Transformation of the European Conception of War 635
Anational legal order,” argued Gustav Adolf Walz, “was offered up to norm-based
individual leveling.”45 The bonds among states within “civilization,” a corner-
stone of the nineteenth century’s approach to international law, were increasingly
questioned. Another argument was that universal legal orders disguised the exer-
cise of sovereignty by some, usually Great Britain and the United States, while
suppressing others’ sovereignty. International law masked power in international
affairs. In this sense, National Socialist legal thought foreshadowed postwar re-
alist thought.46
International law would not hold back the reshaping of international order,
Hans Frank argued.47 Instead, international law required revision to match ex-
isting power relations and social conditions. Again, this conformed closely with
the emphasis in National Socialist legal thought on “realism in international law
and concrete orders.”48 Even National Socialist legal thinkers such as Werner
Best, who many within the SD (Sicherheitsdienst) considered overly legalistic,
stressed the importance of pragmatism in approaching international law and oc-
cupation.49 Not all occupation regimes in Europe should resemble the General
Government of Poland, he argued.50 Yet, Best’s pragmatism scarcely respected
traditional notions of sovereignty. Sovereignty remained malleable; it could be
scaled back in the direction of the “layered” sovereignty associated with extra-
European empires. Best simply wanted practicality to guide occupation regimes.
In 1941, he believed a Grossraum-Ordnung would supplant orders based on uni-
versalistic “international law.” Best seductively contended that late nineteenth-
century international law was a relic from an irrelevant past. Equality among state
sovereigns was part of a system of formalized legal thinking unconnected to real-
ity, similar to abstract legal systems with free-ﬂoating norms such as Hans Kel-
sen’s Pure Theory of Law.5145 Gustav Adolf Walz, “Das Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und Staatliche Recht nach
nationalsozialistischer Rechtsauffassung,” Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht 18 (1934): 147.
46 On realism and Schmitt’s thought, especially with regard to Hans Morgenthau, see
Jan Willem Honig, “Totalitarianism and Realism: Hans Morgenthau’s German Years,”
in The Roots of Realism, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London, 1996), 283–313; Hans-Karl
Pichler, “The Godfathers of ‘Truth’: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in Morgenthau’s The-
ory of Power Politics,” Review of International Studies 24 (1997): 185–200.
47 Hans Frank, “Das Recht im Kriege,”Deutsches Recht 11, nos. 19/20 (1941): 1027.
48 Manfred Messerschmidt, “Revision, neue Ordnung, Krieg: Akzente der Völk-
errechtswissenschaft in Deutschland,” Militärgeschichtliche Mitteillungen 1 (1971): 84.
49 Best argued that lawyers without practical life experience became “Paragraph-
enmaschinen.” Werner Best, “Kritik und Apologie des ‘Juristen,’” Deutsches Recht 9,
nos. 8/9 (1939): 198.
50 Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, 235–38.
51 Werner Best, “Grundfragen einer deutschen Grossraum-Verwaltung,” in Festgabe
für Heinrich Himmler (Darmstadt, 1941), 36. From here, antisemitic National Socialist
legal thinkers could link unmoored legal norms with similarly unconnected and cosmo-
politan peoples, most notably Jews.
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ACarl Schmitt, National Socialist Germany’s most sophisticated legal thinker,
was enamored with the role of power and concepts of war in the international
order. In 1939, Schmitt declared the norm of contained war irrelevant. While he
criticized the League of Nations and its “discriminatory concept of war” for
contained war’s disappearance, he also linked its disappearance to a change in
the European balance of power. Contained war, he maintained, required a bal-
ance of power with a weak Central Europe. “European international law of the
19th century, with its weak European middle and the Western world powers in
the background,” Schmitt contended, “appears to us a little world overshad-
owed by giants.”52 Like Best, Schmitt placed the state and sovereignty in the
world of pre–World War I Europe. Pre–World War I international law had
the state as its subject, and though power differences divided states, sovereign
equality persisted. Schmitt believed the Versailles settlement undermined state
sovereignty but did so from a “paciﬁstic-humanitarian direction.”53 In the fu-
ture, Schmitt believed that contesting continental-based spaces (Raum), as op-
posed to nineteenth-century constructions of state, sovereignty, and interna-
tional law, would be the basis of international order.
This assault on international law and sovereignty had ominous implications
for the law of occupation. As it was, the occupier’s control over conquered ter-
ritory was only temporary. The occupier acted as a trustee for the departed sov-
ereign government, left the local administration in place, and could not alter,
unless militarily necessary, the laws of the departed government. The sover-
eignty of the defeated state was left untouched until the conﬂict’s settlement.
Could anything be more artiﬁcial, more ﬁlled with abstract norms that belied re-
ality, than the law of occupation? The theoretical assault on sovereignty helped
create the intellectual space for a reordering of occupation as pursued not in law
journals or university lecture halls, but on the ground. The rejection of nineteenth-
century international law provided a wedge to argue that the codiﬁed interna-
tional law that emerged from the Hague Conventions and Geneva Conventions
was no longer applicable and that transformative occupations could be pursued.
Occupation administrators, army ofﬁcers, and security ofﬁcials could ignore the
law of occupation and reorder occupied states as they wished. Some National
Socialist legal theorists, such as Werner Best and Hans Frank, went directly into
the occupation apparatus, where they could put legal ideas straight into practice.
Yet it was not as though army ofﬁcers carried National Socialist international52 Carl Schmitt, “Der Reichsbegriff imVölkerrecht,”Deutsches Recht 9, no. 11 (1939):
343.
53 Carl Schmitt, “The Grobraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Interven-
tion for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in Interna-
tional Law (1939–1941),” in Carl Schmitt, Writings on War, trans. and ed. Timothy
Nunan (Cambridge, 2011), 104.
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Alaw textbooks with them: in fact, international law concerning occupation, along
with a range of jus in bello restraints concerning prisoners of war and the like,
was rarely referred to. Prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, isolated argu-
ments against illegal orders such as the Commissar Order, which required that
Soviet political commissars not be treated as prisoners of war but instead be ex-
ecuted on the spot, were framed with little reference to international law. Ofﬁcers
raised the issue of soldier discipline in this case, not legal objections, as Felix
Römer has shown.54 Helmuth James von Moltke, a lawyer with the legal sec-
tion of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW), rejected the National Socialist
approach to international law. He faced incredible difﬁculty in getting legal ar-
guments concerning occupation heard within the Wehrmacht and security ap-
paratus. Moltke focused on the German practice of hostage taking and reprisal
in response to resistance activity. This was a practice clearly regulated by CIL,
which reserved it for a narrow set of circumstances—yet German occupation au-
thorities across Europe quickly resorted to hostage taking and often executed
these hostages in clear contravention of CIL on hostages and reprisal. When
Moltke went to occupation governments in France, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands and intervened on this issue in 1942, he steered clear of legal arguments
and focused on the practical negative repercussions of reprisals, precisely be-
cause he knew that legal arguments carried little weight.55 International law
was no longer a factor in the machinery of force: it had vacated the scene.
In Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, international law was almost
entirely absent. Germany rejected the defeated states’ claims to sovereignty, un-
dermining the law of occupation. Albert Weh, a legal ofﬁcial in the General
Government of Poland, laid this out in a speech in 1943. German arms had de-
cided Poland’s fate as a state. This was, for Weh, the dominant fact of German
occupation in Poland. The occupier ceased to be the occupier in the classic
Hague sense, because the situation was one of debellatio, where the enemy
state had been completely destroyed and no longer functioned in any form, ac-
cording to Weh.56 He contended that the “effectiveness” of the Polish Republic
had disappeared and the Polish state had ceased to exist, never to reappear. This54 Felix Römer, “Das Heeresgruppenkommando Mitte und der Vernichtungskrieg im
Sommer 1941,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 53 (2005): 455.
55 Ger van Roon, “Graf Moltke als Völkerrechtler im OKW,” Vierteljahrshefte für
Zeitgeschichte 18, no. 1 (January 1970): 49–58; Rolf-Dieter Müller, “Kriegsrecht oder
Willkür: Helmuth James Graf von Moltke und die Auffassungen im Generalstab des
Heeres über die Aufgaben der Militärverwaltung vor Beginn des Rußlandkrieges,”
Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 42 (1987): 134; Ger van Roon, “Helmuth James Graf
von Moltke als Völkerrechtler, 1907–1945,” Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches
Recht und Völkerrecht 47 (1987): 751.
56 Arguments regarding debellatio also appeared in the planning for the occupation
of Germany. Such arguments reveal how the National Socialist approach to occupation
This content downloaded from 147.188.108.168 on October 04, 2018 06:40:52 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
638 Gumz
Averdict on the state’s viability, he maintained, separated the Polish case from the
Norwegian or Dutch cases. To support this assessment, Weh cited Hitler’s dec-
laration that the “Polish state of the Versailles Treaty would never rise again.”
Hence none of the Hague strictures on occupation applied to Poland, and it
would experience a more “intense administration” than the Hague Conventions
permitted.57
De-sovereignizing occupied areas and pushing aside the law of occupation
created space for transformative German occupations in these countries. Rec-
ognizing the consequences of the German approach to international law does
not seek to diminish arguments that emphasize how National Socialist racial
ideology inﬂuenced occupations in Eastern Europe; it simply stresses that the
development of this ideology also required international legal space. To dismiss
the importance of the National Socialist campaign against the law of occupation
discounts the inﬂuence of international law on state behavior, almost accepting
National Socialist arguments about its irrelevance. National Socialist Germany’s
intellectual dismantling of the norms of containedwar, sovereignty, and the law of
occupation created a legal vacuum for National Socialist occupations. The ab-
sence of internationally sanctioned methods for controlling territory also meant
that Germany found it difﬁcult to exert effective control over occupied territories.
A link existed between de-sovereignization at the hands of National Socialist
Germany, transformative occupations, and the fragility of German control over
Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. Such occupations provided no respite
from war, but an intensiﬁcation of it.
The National Socialist occupation in Eastern Europe immediately delegit-
imized existing local structures of power, sometimes through extremely violent
means, such as the National Socialist AB program (Ausserordentliche Be-
friedingungsaktion) that targeted thousands of Polish elites for execution in
1939–40. In other cases, such as in the Independent State of Croatia, it involved
turning over the state to a perceived “friendly” national group that then re-
worked the local administration.58 In all cases, it was clear even at the lowest
levels that the previous regime, including its legal system, was to be radically
reworked. Those in occupied territories sensed that fundamental shifts in powerfurther destabilized the situation in occupied countries. Even Hans Kelsen argued for
debellatio. See Hans Kelsen, “The International Legal Status of Germany to Be Estab-
lished Immediately Upon Termination of the War,” American Journal of International
Law 38, no. 4 (October 1944): 689–94.
57 Albert Weh, “Die rechtliche Grundlagen des Generalgouvernements,” in Das
Generalgouvernement: Seine Verwaltung und seine Wirtschaft, ed. Josef Bühler (Cra-
cow, 1943), 59–74.
58 Emily Greble, Sarajevo, 1941–1945: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Hitler’s
Europe (Ithaca, NY, 2011), 60–61.
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Awere near, and various nationalist groups, in particular those who had previously
been excluded, moved to assert power under National Socialist occupations.
The murderous conﬂict between Poles and Ukrainians in Volhynia offers an ex-
ample of how indigenous nationalist agendas drove conﬂict beneath German oc-
cupation and of the difﬁculty those regimes faced trying to control the conse-
quences.59
In this world, conﬂict did not end with occupation. German security forces
forced a strategic and operational logic over occupied areas that bound them
to the war at the front and to German home-front needs. The contest with parti-
sans in Belorussia became linked with labor and food drives whose brutal logic
led to “dead zones” cleared of people and food with extraordinary force.60 Tim-
othy Snyder argues that it was precisely in these “stateless zones” that the Ho-
locaust assumed its most murderous dimensions.61 With utter disregard for the
limited rights of occupied populations,Wehrmacht and security forces substituted
a strategy of terror for effective control. Herewemight return toCarl Schmitt, who
believed that conceptions ofwar rested at the heart of every systemof international
law. The norm of contained conﬂict, linked to the law of occupation, had disap-
peared. National Socialism’s vision of war as a permanent elemental contest un-
fettered by international rules ravaged Eastern Europe.62 Into this contest rushed
all the other factors that we know only too well were responsible for the chaos and
violence of National Socialist occupation, such as extreme racism, complete dis-
respect for property rights, and an often bewildering mix of cross-cutting admin-
istrative, security, and military jurisdictions.
Of course, in the West, occupation was different. Germany attempted to hew,
at least partially, to the law of occupation in several respects. None of the occu-
pied countries in theWest experienced de-sovereignization similar to that in parts
of Eastern Europe. Most local institutions kept functioning in occupied France,
and in Denmark the entire government remained in place until 1943.63 This is
not to deny that German occupation forces committed quite clear transgressions59 Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Bela-
rus, 1569–1999 (NewHaven, CT, 2003), 155–78, and Snyder, “The Causes of Ukrainian-
Polish Ethnic Cleansing,” Past and Present 179 (2003): 197–234.
60 Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde: Die Deutsche Wirtschafts-und Vernichtungs-
politik in Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg, 2000), 1010–36.
61 Timothy Snyder, Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning (London,
2015), 216–17.
62 This escalatory, uncontrollable approach to war remains best elucidated in Michael
Geyer, “Krieg als Gesellschaftspolitik: Anmerkungen zu neueren Arbeiten über das Dritte
Reich im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 20 (1986): 557–601.
63 On Denmark, see Karem Gram-Skjoldager, “The Law of the Jungle?: Denmark’s
International Legal Status during the Second World War,” International History Review
33, no. 2 (June 2011): 235–56.
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Aof the law of occupation in theWest, most obviously in the deportation and mur-
der of Jews. Other policies, such as the large-scale forced labor drives beginning
in mid-1942, also constituted obvious violations and fueled resistance move-
ments. Yet, the war against resistance in the West never reached the level of sys-
tematized brutality present in the East. The Wehrmacht hedged when it came to
placing occupiedWestern Europe into an international legal no-man’s land. Peter
Lieb demonstrates that according belligerent status to resistance members and
limiting reprisals for resistance attacks were live issues for Wehrmacht leaders
in France as the war began in earnest again there in 1944.64 Stability in occupied
areas of France or the Netherlands meant that German occupation authorities ex-
erted far more control over these territories than in Belorussia or Croatia. At least
until 1942, and in some places 1944, war’s violence receded from large swaths of
the occupied West. Nonetheless, central Italy experienced the brutality of Wehr-
macht antipartisan warfare, and several units ﬁghting in France in 1944 carried
over their accustomed practices from Eastern to Western Europe.65 Still, events
such as the destruction of Oradour-sur-Glane by the 2nd SS Panzer Division re-
mained controversial in the German occupation apparatus to a degree that similar
events were not in the East.66
Yet, such internal controversies do not change the fundamental nature of Na-
tional Socialist Germany’s assault on the law of occupation. The intellectual as-
sault was complicit in creating a devastating wartime reality for Eastern Europe.
Even as postwar trials loomed,Wehrmacht ofﬁcers could not extract themselves
from language surrounding antipartisan warfare that bore no afﬁnity with the law
of occupation. In November 1945, Hans Röttger, aWehrmacht general, attempted
to explain his role in antipartisan warfare to his lawyer, but he let slip that anti-
partisan war allowed for “ruthless liquidation of the Jews and other undesirable64 Peter Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?: Kriegführung
und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44 (Munich, 2007), 244–47.
65 On Italy, see Lutz Klinkhammer, Zwischen Bündnis und Besatzung: Das National-
sozialistischeDeutschland und die Republik von Salò 1943–1945 (Tübingen, 1993); Fried-
rich Andrae,Auch gegen Frauen undKinder: Der Krieg der DeutschenWehrmacht gegen
die Zivilbevölkerung in Italien 1943–1945 (Munich, 1995);MichaelWedekind,National-
sozialistische Besatzungs und Annexionspolitik in Norditalien, 1943–1945 (Munich, 2003);
Carlo Gentile,Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Partisanenkrieg: Italien 1943–1945 (Pader-
born, 2012). On Eastern front practices in France, see Peter Lieb, “Repercussions of East-
ern Front Experiences on Anti-Partisan Warfare in France, 1943–1944,” Journal of Stra-
tegic Studies 31, no. 5 (2008): 797–823.
66 The Wehrmacht feared that soldiers’ experiences in Eastern Europe meant they
would not recognize that the “rules of the game” vis-à-vis the population needed to change
once ﬁghting started within the Reich. See Rolf-Dieter Müller, ed., Das deutsche Reich
und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 10, no. 1, Der Zusammenbruch des deutschen Reiches:
Die militärische Niederwerfung der Wehrmacht (Munich, 2008), 625.
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Aelements.”67 The general consensus among theAllieswas that German occupation
practices departed radically from the law of occupation. Allied governments-in-
exile, mostly fromWestern Europe, but also from places like Poland and Yugosla-
via, encouraged this impression of lawlessness from their perches in London. The
portrayal of National Socialist occupation ﬂattened out differences within Europe
and adopted a general “Europe under National Socialist lawlessness” argument.
This argument portrayed occupation in Eastern Europe more accurately than oc-
cupation in the West.68 For Western Europe, however, even the 1944–45 brush
with German security forces using practices that had been routine in the East
since 1941 cemented the perception of the occupation as a time of utter lawless-
ness and brutality. In turn, it brought the practices and experiences of military
occupation within “civilized” Europe into disturbingly close proximity with those
of nineteenth-century European colonial warfare.
The Hostages Trial
National Socialist andWehrmacht ofﬁcials eviscerated the law of occupation and
fought a war outside the norm of contained conﬂict. Yet in postwar trials those
same ofﬁcials often argued that their wartime conduct was in accordance with
the law of occupation and the norm of contained conﬂict. While some historians
of human rights maintain these years provided moments of clarity on interna-
tional law, the law of occupation remained highly conﬂicted.69 The world of
the Hague Conference of 1899 had not quite left the scene. This makes the sym-
pathetic hearing that some German defense arguments garnered unsurprising.
Nowhere was this clearer than in the so-called Hostages Trial of 1947–48, which
conﬁrmed Hague approaches to the law of occupation and reafﬁrmed the danger-
ous position of armed resistance to an established occupation.
Reprisals and hostages were not innovations of National Socialist Germany:
theywere issueswithwhich international lawwas long familiar, though theHague67 Manfred Messerschmidt, “Vorwärtsverteidigung: Die ‘Denkschrift der Generäle’
für denNürnbergerGerichtshof,” inManfredMesserschmidt,Militarismus, Vernichtungs-
krieg, Geschichtspolitik: Zur deutschenMilitär- und Rechtsgeschichte (Paderborn, 2006),
316.
68 See, e.g., John Armitage, ed., Europe in Bondage: Reports of the London General
Assembly (London, 1942). This lack of differentiation between occupation inWestern and
Eastern Europewas particularly strong in London, an “intellectual hub” of theAllied effort
on war crimes. See Kim Christian Priemel, “‘A Story of Betrayal’: Conceptualizing Var-
iants of Capitalism in the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials,” Journal of Modern History 85,
no. 1 (March 2013): 75.
69 Elizabeth Borgwardt argues that the Nuremberg Trials created a norm on crimes
against humanity, but she examines only the trials of major war criminals. See Elizabeth
Borgwardt, “ANew Deal for the Nuremberg Trial: The Limits of Law in Generating Hu-
man Rights Norms,” Law and History Review 26, no. 3 (October 2008): 679–705.
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AConventions largely bypassed them.70 Reprisals are actions carried out in response
to a perceived violation of international law by an opponent. The object of a re-
prisal should be another state, and its goal is to return that state to lawful behavior.
The content of a reprisal is something that by prevailing standards would “nor-
mally be unlawful,” according to Christopher Greenwood.71 The 1929 Geneva
Conventions forbade reprisals against prisoners of war, but it did not touch repri-
sals in occupation. Prominent texts from CIL, the Lieber Code from the US Civil
War, and the Oxford Code of 1880 allowed for reprisals. By the prevailing stan-
dards of CIL in the Second World War, reprisals and hostage taking were consid-
ered legal. British and American military manuals allowed for reprisals against
hostages in military occupation.72 In the context of military occupation, reprisals
were usually carried out against hostages taken from the occupied population.
Hostages, the argument went, could be taken from the civilian population as a
guarantee for its peaceful behavior. If that behavior became unlawful, reprisals
would be carried out against the hostages. Yet reprisals, according to CIL, existed
under a tight set of restrictions. They were a very last, not a ﬁrst, resort. They had
to be proportionate to the offense they attempted to redress, could be authorized
only by the highest authority, and were not for purposes of revenge, but to return
the offending state back to lawful behavior.
Reprisals and hostages came together in the Hostages Trial, one of the post-
war trials to which historians have paid little attention.73 It concerned less impor-
tant fronts in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Norway, and it came late in the series of
American-run trials. It focused on high-ranking Wehrmacht commanders who
ordered reprisals against hostages in retaliation for partisan attacks. Taking hos-
tages to guarantee the safety of its forces in occupied areas was not new for the70 Fritz Kalshoven argues that despite prohibiting collective punishment in Article 50,
the delegates at The Hague in 1899 still believed “that an occupant could resort to repri-
sals in situations where collective punishment would be out of the question.” See Fritz
Kalshoven, “Human Rights, the Law of Armed Conﬂict, and Reprisals,” International
Review of the Red Cross 11, no. 121 (April 1971): 183–84. See also Edward Kwakwa,
“Belligerent Reprisals in the Law of Armed Conﬂict,” Stanford Journal of International
Law 49 (1990–91): 49–54.
71 Christopher Greenwood, “The Twilight of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals,” Neth-
erlands Yearbook of International Law 20 (December 1989): 37–38.
72 For turn-of-the-century discussions of hostages, see J. M. Spaight, War Rights on
Land (London, 1911), 468–69; Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 2,
War and Neutrality (London, 1906), 41, 271–73. On the discussion of hostages and repri-
sals in the American and British legal literature during and afterWorldWar II, seeArthurK.
Kuhn, “The Execution of Hostages,” American Journal of International Law 36, no. 2
(April 1942): 271–74; Ellen Hammer andMarina Salvin, “The Taking of Hostages in The-
ory and Practice,”American Journal of International Law 38, no. 1 (January 1944): 20–33.
73 One little-noticed exception is Richard Cavell Fattig, “Reprisal: The German Army
and the Execution of Hostages during the Second World War” (PhD diss., University of
California, San Diego, 1980).
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AGerman military. The German Imperial Army had also taken hostages, along
with other European armies, but the Wehrmacht radically expanded this prac-
tice.74 Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel’s order of September 16, 1941, demand-
ing that ﬁfty to one hundred hostages be executed for every German soldier
wounded or killed is exemplary in this respect.75 Under the guise of reprisals,
the Wehrmacht murdered Jewish “hostages” as part of the Final Solution in Ser-
bia.76 In the Hostages Trial, the defendants’ lawyers knew what approaches had
failed in earlier trials, and they avoided arguments based on the orders of supe-
riors and, to some degree, the tu quoque or “you too” argument, which asserted
that other countries had pursued policies similar to Germany’s in comparable cir-
cumstances. Instead, they chose to rely on a strategy that repositioned the Wehr-
macht’s actions within the Hague Conventions.77
During the trial, three lines of questioning became prominent. The ﬁrst cen-
tered onwhether an effective occupation existed inYugoslavia andGreece. The sec-
ond related to the excessive nature of reprisals and the lack of an ordered process
for selecting hostages. The third focused on theWehrmacht’s denial of belligerent
status for resistance members in Yugoslavia and Greece. Through hostages, repri-
sals, and resistance to occupation, the trial delved into issues associated with mil-
itary occupation that had nearly derailed the 1899 Hague Conference.
The prosecution ﬁrst contended that Germany had never instituted an “effec-
tive occupation” in Yugoslavia and could not claim status as an occupying power.
“No doubt,” Telford Taylor declared in his opening statement, “the Germans,
had they so chosen, could have left sufﬁcient troops in Yugoslavia to establish
their authority throughout the country.” An effective military occupation, Taylor
argued, required a constant, consistent presence throughout the occupied country.
But Germany never had this presence in Yugoslavia, choosing instead to with-
draw most of its occupation force for the coming invasion of the Soviet Union.74 Fattig, “Reprisal,” 1–23.
75 Wilhelm Keitel, “Concerning the Suppression of Insurgents in Occupied Territo-
ries,” September 16, 1941, in Trial of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tri-
bunals, vol. 11, “The High Command Case”; “The Hostage Case” (Washington, DC,
1950), 971.
76 See Christopher Browning, “Wehrmacht Reprisal Policy and the Murder of Male
Jews in Serbia,” in Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution (New
York, 1985), 39–56; Walter Manoschek, “Serbien ist Judenfrei”: Militärische Besatzungs-
politik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien, 1941/42 (Munich, 1993), 86–102.
77 The lead defense attorney in the Hostages case, Hans Laternser, represented Albert
Kesselring before a British military tribunal in Italy in 1947, where he discovered that
claiming ignorance of subordinate actions was not persuasive. Kerstin von Lingen, Kes-
selring’s Last Battle: War Crimes Trials and Cold War Politics, 1945–1960 (Lawrence,
KS, 2009), 126. Laternser would go on to represent defendants at the Frankfurt Ausch-
witz Trial. See Rebecca Wittmann, Beyond Justice: The Auschwitz Trial (Cambridge,
MA, 2005), 189, 206–7.
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ACoupledwith the absence of an effective occupation, Germany instituted a “crim-
inal regime of terror.” “If the occupying forces inaugurate a systematic program
of criminal terror,” Taylor asserted, “they cannot thereafter call the inhabitants to
account for taking measures for self-defense.” The prosecution conceded that
nothing like this “appears in somanywords inTheHagueConventions.”78 There-
fore, Taylor invoked the Martens clause for support, maintaining “that this is the
only conclusion which is possible in accordance with ‘the principles of the law
of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples,
from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.’”79 Through
the Martens clause, Taylor sought to blunt the duty of obedience placed on an
occupied population.
The defense, by contrast, portrayed the Wehrmacht as the defender of the law
of occupation and the norm of contained conﬂict. The resistance movements, it
argued, were illegal. Hans Laternser, the lead attorney, vigorously pressed this
argument. The Wehrmacht always adhered to Hague Convention strictures con-
cerning occupation, Laternser maintained. He skipped over inconvenient facts,
such as the illegal dismemberment of Yugoslavia prior to capitulation or the
creation of the Independent State of Croatia, both violations of Yugoslavian sov-
ereignty. Laternser also turned to the tu quoque argument, noting that reprisals
against hostages for attacks on occupation forces were established practices in
numerous armies.80 But his main argument centered on the existence of an estab-
lished occupation in Yugoslavia and Greece that made reprisals against hostages
permissible and resistance illegal. “Four facts are of importance in the evaluation
of the legality of the resistance forces,” Laternser asserted: “1. That a war can
be waged between states or governments only; 2. That an actual state of war is
terminated by capitulation or by the cessation of organized resistance after the
destruction of the main forces; 3. The actual occupation; and 4. The rights and
duties of the population in the occupied territory.” Deploying these criteria,
Laternser sought to deny that resistance members were entitled to belligerent sta-
tus. He claimed that “an individual does not become a lawful belligerent bywear-
ing a uniform, carrying weapons openly, and being under the command of a per-
son responsible for his subordinates.”81 The defendants, Laternser contended,
understood war within the norm of contained conﬂict. “War is a ﬁght between78 NARA, Hostages Trial, Opening Statement of the Prosecution, July 18, 1947, roll 2,
frame 664.
79 NARA, Hostages Trial, Opening Statement of the Prosecution, July 18, 1947, roll 2,
frame 668.
80 NARA,Hostages Trial, Statement ofDr. Hans Laternser, September 15, 1947, roll 5,
frame 23.
81 NARA,Hostages Trial, Statement of Dr. Hans Laternser, September 15, 1947, roll 5,
frame 62.
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Agovernments,”Laternser stressed, “which theﬁghting forces serve andwithwhich
they have to be identiﬁed, so that one can speak of war in the strictest sense of
the word.”82 The armistice agreements with the Yugoslav and Greek armies and
the established occupation made resistance illegal and justiﬁed the Wehrmacht’s
denial of belligerent status to resistance members as well as its reprisals against
hostages. This emphasis on Yugoslavian and Greek capitulation as establishing
occupation was a shift from Taylor’s stress on “effective” occupation.
In defending the Wehrmacht’s reprisals and its denial of belligerent status to
resistance ﬁghters, General Hermann Foertsch, chief of staff to successive Ger-
man commands in the Balkans frommid-1941 to mid-1944, based his arguments
on the existence of an established, “effective” occupation. Foertsch had a histor-
ical bent, having published military historical works as well as contemporary
works on the military and a general study of war in 1939.83 Another Wehrmacht
general, Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, claimed Foertsch was the force behind
the Wehrmacht’s dramatic escalations of force in the Balkans.84 Foertsch was a
formidable opponent who, unlike others, grasped the degree to which German
defenses rested on convincing the court that an established military occupation
existed in Yugoslavia and Greece. Foertsch’s defense lawyer asked him for his
opinion on the legality of resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece. Foertsch replied:
“To me it was always clear and it has always remained clear that the illegality of
all these actions could never be doubted for two essential reasons: ﬁrstly, Yugo-
slavia and the Greek armies had capitulated. Secondly, the countries were prop-
erly occupied. Therefore, every armed action irrespective of what kind, was a
breach of the capitulation conditions and thus a violation of the duties of the pop-
ulation of an occupied country.”85 Like Laternser, Foertsch stressed capitulation
as one of the central elements in establishing occupation. In this focus on capit-
ulation, one senses that older arguments of “war treason” prevalent within the
German Army prior to the First World War and some of the international law lit-
erature lurked in the background. The capitulation of the country was almost con-
strued as an oath on the part of the population, so that their resistancewas awillful82 NARA,Hostages Trial, Statement ofDr. Hans Laternser, September 15, 1947, roll 5,
frame 44.
83 Hermann Foertsch, Kriegskunst Heute und Morgen (Berlin, 1939); Foertsch, Die
Wehrmacht im Nationalsozialistischen Staat (Hamburg, 1935); Foertsch, Reichsheer im
Dritten Reich (Berlin, 1935). Foertsch was active in conservative circles in West Ger-
many and worked at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich after the war. See Astrid M.
Eckert, “The Transnational Beginnings ofWest German Zeitgeschichte in the 1950s,”Central
European History 40, no. 1 (March 2007): 74.
84 Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, Ein General im Zwielicht: Die Erinnerungen Ed-
mund Glaises von Horstenau, vol. 3, ed. Peter Broucek (Vienna, 1988), 240.
85 NARA, Hostages Trial, Cross-Examination of Hermann Foertsch, October 10, 1947,
roll 6, frames 338–39.
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Abetrayal of this oath.86 In the context of reprisal, this emphasis on capitulation
seemed to shift the target away from the enemy state and directly onto the occu-
pied population. The prosecution also focused on the way in which Tito’s parti-
sans appeared to fulﬁll conditions for belligerent status through their level of or-
ganization, uniforms, and tendency to carry weapons openly. Foertsch refused to
engage with this assertion, as had other German defendants. The partisans might
have fulﬁlled these conditions, he admitted, but that was beside the point because
those conditions did not apply in an occupation. Occupation foreclosed the pos-
sibility of legal belligerent status for resistance ﬁghters. As a result, “we never
had any doubt that a legal or international claim of our so-called enemy could
exist.”87
In his cross-examination of Foertsch, the assistant prosecutor, Theodore
Fenstermacher, wanted Foertsch to admit that resistance ﬁghters were legal bel-
ligerents. Fenstermacher pointed to high-level discussions among Wehrmacht
commanders in the Balkans in mid-1943 concerning potential recognition of
partisans as belligerents. General Alexander Löhr, later convicted and executed
in Belgrade in 1947, raised the possibility of extending belligerent status to the
partisans in internal deliberations in 1942. This, Fenstermacher contended, proved
theWehrmacht did not consider Tito’s partisans illegal belligerents. Foertsch coun-
tered that expediency, not an attempt to legalize the partisans, motivated these
deliberations. They stemmed from a “feeling of responsibility to put this nause-
ating struggle on a more human basis in the interest of our own troops and in the
interest of the long-suffering population of the Southeast.” Turning to the Hague
qualiﬁcations for belligerent status in an invasion, Fenstermacher tried to get
Foertsch to concede that the partisans wore a recognizable insignia and thus de-
served belligerent status. Fenstermacher asked, “You treated the partisans, who
wore insignia, just as if they had not worn any insignia?” In response, Foertsch
quipped “Yes, of course. A robber remains a robber even if he appears in a tux-
edo.” An exasperated Fenstermacher declared it mattered little if the partisans
wore insignia, were under uniﬁed command, or carried weapons openly; the
Germans always considered them illegal. Foertsch shot back, “concerning this
subject I believe I have repeatedly stated on direct examination, and we thought
at the time, we could de jure not regard these Partisan organizations as compat-
ible with International Law.”8886 Hull, A Scrap of Paper, 105–6; Lassa Oppenheim, “OnWar Treason,” Law Quar-
terly Review 33 (1917): 266–86.
87 NARA, Hostages Trial, Cross-Examination of Hermann Foertsch, October 10,
1947, roll 6, frames 339–40.
88 NARA, Hostages Trial, Cross-Examination of Hermann Foertsch, October 20,
1947, roll 6, frames 839–41.
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AFenstermacher also addressed the issue of effective occupation. In response,
Foertsch stressed that the German occupation apparatus and its combat forces
could exert power wherever they chose. Thus, partisan control of territory was
a mirage.89 Foertsch also focused on the occupied population’s duty of obedi-
ence. It had a duty “to keep peace and order, and here it does not make any dif-
ference for the partisan Meier or franc-tireur Mueller whether there are 20 divi-
sions in the area or four divisions located in the same area. He has to turn in his
riﬂe, that is all there is to it.”90 Fenstermacher ﬁnally invoked Germany’s “illegal
war” against Yugoslavia and Greece, contending that this invalidated German
claims to legal occupation in these countries. Foertsch invoked the norm of con-
tained conﬂict in his response to Fenstermacher. “That the armies were in Yu-
goslavia illegally is not the point at all,” he explained, “and I don’t even know
whether you can put it that in war, that an army can be somewhere illegally. A
war is waged in the manner that an army invades the country against which war
is waged, and if then the army is in that country it is there because of the events
of the war. That is not a function of legality or illegality.”91
The case came before three judges: Charles Wennerstrum from Iowa, George
J. Burke from Michigan, and Edward Carter from Nebraska. The court dis-
missed the defense’s arguments that referenced “superior orders” or tu quoque
with regard to British and American military manuals.92 It found all defendants
with the exception of Foertsch guilty. The court found that as they were insti-
tuted, Wehrmacht reprisals were murder, not conforming with CIL. They lacked
proportionality, there was no ordered process regulating them, and there was
usually no connection between where the attacks on German soldiers took place
and the hostages killed in reprisal for these attacks. There was no deterrent func-
tion to Wehrmacht reprisals that attempted in a clear manner to return a speciﬁc
part of the population to obedience as CIL required. Moreover, reprisals hardly
constituted acts of “last resort” for German occupation forces, who immediately
availed themselves of them whenever attacked. They were revenge, which was
precisely what they could not be under CIL.89 Later assessments of effective occupation seem to offer support to Foertsch’s argu-
ment. See United Nations, Judgment of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Commit-
ted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Prosecutor vs. Mladen Naletilic
and Vinko Martinovic, March 31, 2003, 73–74, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilic
_martinovic/tjug/en/nal-tj030331-e.pdf.
90 NARA, Hostages Trial, Cross-Examination of Hermann Foertsch, October 17, 1947,
roll 6, frame 783.
91 NARA, Hostages Trial, Cross-Examination of Hermann Foertsch, October 20, 1947,
roll 6, frame 836.
92 On the conﬂict between Wennerstrum and Fenstermacher, see New York Times,
March 6, 1948.
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AAt the same time, the court conﬁrmed the acceptability of hostage taking in a
military occupation as a practice sanctioned by CIL. The court conceded the
practice was a “barbarous relic of ancient times,” but it accepted its legality, de-
claring “it is not our province to write international law as we would have it, we
must apply it as we ﬁnd it.” The examination of the practice “convinces us,” the
court declared, “that hostages may be taken in order to guarantee the peaceful
conduct of the populations of occupied territories, and, when certain conditions
exist and the necessary preliminaries have been taken, they may, as a last resort,
be shot.”93 “Peaceful conduct” was a veiled reference to the duty of obedience
that Martens had invoked forty-eight years earlier at the Hague conference.
Alongside the court’s review of hostages and reprisals came an assessment
of the legality of resistance to occupation. The court rewarded the defense’s ef-
fort to reposition German actions within the law of occupation. This was less a
misinterpretation of international law or a proof of the weakness of nineteenth-
century international law than a testimony to its persistence and strength after
1945. The court believed that the question of whether or not an occupation ex-
isted in fact in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Norway was critical. “The question of
criminality,” the court maintained, “may well hinge on whether an invasion was
in progress or an occupation accomplished.” For the court, Yugoslavia and Greece
were effectively occupied by June 1941. Agreeing further with German defense,
the court also cited the capitulation of the Yugoslav and Greek armies as helping
to establish occupation. Finally, the court accepted Foertsch’s assertion that the
Wehrmacht could assert control if it so chose and denied the prosecution’s con-
tention that partisan control of territory invalidated claims to “effective occupa-
tion.”94
Once the court accepted that Yugoslavia and Greece were effectively occu-
pied, resistance ﬁghters stood on shaky ground. While the partisans, Chetniks,
andNational Greek Republican League (EDES) inGreecemay have fulﬁlled the
requirements for belligerent status, the court declared: “No crime can properly
be charged against the defendants for the killing of such captured members of
the resistance forces, they being franc-tireurs.” The court compared resistance
ﬁghters to “spies” within existing international law. Belligerents used spies, but
if spies were captured, they were not entitled to POW status. “Just as the spy93 NARA, Hostages Trial, Court Judgment, February 19, 1948, roll 12, frame 1074.
This conclusion later raised opposition among some legal scholars. Lord Wright cited,
among other texts, the Martens clause in support of his position; see Lord Wright, “The
Killing of Hostages as a War Crime,” British Yearbook of International Law 25 (1948):
302. For a later view that accepts the possibility of reprisals against civilians in occupied
territories and restates the CIL argument in favor of reprisals, see A. R. Albrecht, “War
Reprisals in the War Crimes Trials and in the Geneva Conventions of 1949,” American
Journal of International Law 47, no. 4 (October 1953): 590–614.
94 NARA, Hostages Trial, Court Judgment, February 19, 1948, roll 12, frame 1068.
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Amay act lawfully for his country and at the same time be a war criminal to the
enemy, so guerrillas may render great service to their country and, in the event
of success, become heroes even,” the court claimed, yet “still they remain war
criminals in the eyes of the enemy and may be treated as such.” This mirrored
the defense’s arguments regarding resistancemovements’ legal status and rejected
prosecution arguments. The court also echoed Laternser’s arguments regarding
contained conﬂict and limiting belligerent status to those ﬁghting for existing
states. “A resistance not supported by an organized government,” the court ar-
gued, “is criminal and deprives participants of belligerent status.”95 Not without
foundation in the international legal literature from the period, the court vigorously
reasserted late nineteenth-century international law on occupation and guerril-
las.96 The court did this to the beneﬁt, at least to some degree, of the very people
who thoroughly disavowed the law of occupation during the war. Like Martens
in his arguments on occupation, the court stressed the occupied population’s duty
of obedience, and this led it to deny legal protection to resistance against an es-
tablished occupation. In spite of the war, the legal legitimacy of resistance to oc-
cupation suffered a massive reversal.
The Geneva Conventions, Resistance, and the New State of War
Undermining the legitimacy of resistance struck at the foundation of postwar
European politics. For Western Europe, wartime resistance remained an unques-
tioned good. Yet, occupation also caused deep cleavages within occupied socie-
ties. Who was a collaborator? Was a mayor in France who worked with German
occupation ofﬁcials a traitor or someone discharging his functions in accordance
with the Hague Conventions?What about the obvious connections between those
in postwar governments and collaborators in countries such as Greece? Where
did ordinary criminality end and resistance to occupation begin?97 The potential95 NARA, Hostages Trial, Court Judgment, February 19, 1948, roll 12, frames 1068–71.
96 See, e.g., Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 2, War and Neu-
trality (London, 1906), 70–71; Lester Nurick and Roger W. Barrett, “Legality of Guer-
rilla Forces Under the Laws of War,” American Journal of International Law 40, no. 3
(July 1946): 582. See also the following contemporary assessments from the legal liter-
ature, in Kalshoven, “Human Rights, the Law of Armed Conﬂict, and Reprisals,” 184;
Jörn Axel Kämmerer, “Kriegsrepressalie oder Kriegsverbrechen?: Zur rechtlichen Beur-
teilung der Massenxekutionen von Zivilisten durch die deutsche Besatzungsmacht im
Zweiten Weltkrieg,” Archiv des Völkerrechts 37, nos. 3/4 (September 1999): 288.
97 See, e.g., Pieter LaGrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and
National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945–1965 (Cambridge, 2000), 19–78; LaGrou,
“Regaining theMonopoly of Force: Agents of the State Shooting Fugitives In andAround
Belgium,” Past and Present, suppl. 6 (2011): 178–95; Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of
Europe since 1945 (NewYork, 2005), 64–66;MarkMazower, “The ColdWar and theAp-
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Aexplosiveness of these questions made securing international legitimacy for re-
sistance to occupation attractive. The clean categories of international law pro-
vided a risk-free setting to bury occupation’s complicated memories, at least in
terms of domestic European politics.
As such, international law and norms for future wars helped conﬁrm public
European memories of World War II, and they did so by securing legal legiti-
macy for resistance to occupation. Some postwar national courts in Europe were
testing the waters in this direction. In 1948 and 1949, Dutch national courts try-
ing the Wehrmacht commander in the occupied Netherlands, General Friedrich
Christiansen, and the leader of the security forces there, Hans Rauter, rejected
capitulation’s role in establishing occupation. The Dutch court in the Christian-
sen case denied that an occupied population had a duty of obedience as long as
international law refused to distinguish “between a legitimate and illegitimate
occupation.”98 Such contentions, which took a jus ad bellum argument that con-
centrated on the legitimacy of a state’s decision for conﬂict and linked it to oc-
cupation, resembled those put forth by the prosecution in the Hostages Trial and
rejected by the court at that trial.
Whatever its basis, the possibility of legal resistance to occupation encoun-
tered American and British opposition from 1945 onward. American diplomats
did not even anticipate the need for a wholesale reworking of the rules of war. In
September 1945, a State Department ofﬁcial skeptically noted that “it is not, I
believe, seriously contended that anymajor changes are necessary in the Geneva
Convention.” “Non-humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war,” he explained,
“was not due to defects in the Convention but failure to adhere to its terms.”99
Even American diplomats sympathetic to revisions believed they would be mi-
nor ones.100 Issues the Americans wanted addressed included salutes between
guards and prisoners, transfers of prisoners between countries, and paying pris-
oners of war for work.101 Later State Department planning for preparatory con-
ferences envisioned new standards of treatment for civilian internees.102 Anotherpropriation ofMemory: Greece after Liberation,” in The Politics of Retribution in Europe:
World War II and Its Aftermath, ed. István Deak, Jan T. Gross, and Tony Judt (Princeton,
NJ, 2000), 212–31.
98 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals,
vol. 14, Trial of Hans Albin Rauter (London, 1949), 124–38.
99 National Archives and Record Administration (NARA), Department of State, In-
ternal Memorandum (Bancroft), 514.2 Geneva/12-1945, box 2386, November 16, 1945.
100 NARA, Department of State, Albert Clattenburg (Special Projects Division) to
Bancroft, 514.2 Geneva/12-1945, box 2386, December 19, 1945.
101 NARA, Special Projects Division, “Observations with Regard to Amendments to
the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention,” 514.2 Geneva/12-1945, box 2386, Decem-
ber 4, 1945.
102 NARA, Ofﬁce of the State Department Legal Advisor to Albert Clattenburg,
514.2 Geneva/1-1946, box 2386, January 18, 1946.
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Adiplomat believed that “general principles” should be established for the treat-
ment of civilian populations in occupied territories. This meant restricting forced
labor, prohibiting deportation, and guaranteeing a “minimum level of subsistence
and public health in an occupied country.”103 For the State Department’s legal ad-
visor, Alwyn Freeman, such principles “duplicate or repeat, if not the text, the
spirit of Articles 42 to 53, inclusive, of the Regulations annexed to Hague Con-
vention IVof 1907.”104 None of the Americans, however, foresaw how resistance
to occupation would become so important.
The so-called European “resistance” countries placed this issue at center stage.
At the Conference of Government Experts in Geneva in 1946, POW status for
resistance ﬁghters caused the “bitterest argument,” according to one ofﬁcial.105
According resistance ﬁghters POW status radically reduced the risk of resistance
to occupation, transformed resisters into legal belligerents, and made continued
conﬂict in an occupied territory a legitimate sphere of war. At Geneva, delega-
tions from Western and Eastern Europe were gripped by fear of occupation.
Many assumed, according to American observers, that future occupations would
replicate those of World War II. Resistance ﬁghters needed legal protection. The
resistance countries, according to American representatives, “were unwilling to
accept any further limitation intended to establish a differentiation between spo-
radic assassins and saboteurs against whom an occupant must exercise his po-
lice powers.”Already, these types of distinctions drawn between legitimate resis-
tance to occupation and “saboteurs” demonstrated the extent to which arguments
over resistance to occupation had shifted in comparison to those at The Hague
ﬁfty years earlier. The United States sought a highly restrictive deﬁnition of re-
sistance. By contrast, France balked at the suggestion, in line with Hague Con-
vention regulations for belligerent status, that resistance ﬁghters carry weapons
openly. The American delegation felt pressed by the resistance countries, but it
insisted that a resistance movement must have “effective control of territory”
in order to accord its ﬁghters POW status. This line prevailed at the Stockholm
conference in 1947, but many bitterly resented it.106 The French wanted no re-
quirement for territorial control.107 Going even further, the Polish delegate sought103 NARA, Albert Clattenburg to the Legal Advisor, “Civilian Population of Occu-
pied Countries,” 514.2 Geneva/5-246, box 2386, May 2, 1946.
104 NARA, State Department Legal Advisor to Special Projects Division, 514.2 Ge-
neva/5-216, box 2386, May 10, 1946.
105 NARA, Telegram from US Delegation at Geneva to the Secretary of State, 514.2
Geneva/4-2847, box 2387, April 28, 1947.
106 NARA, Conﬁdential Report from Albert Clattenburg to the Secretary of State,
514.2 Geneva/8-2647, box 2387, August 26, 1947.
107 NARA, International Committee of the Red Cross, “Summary Report of the
Work of the Conference of Government Experts for the Study of the Conventions for
the Protection of War Victims,” 514.2 Geneva/8-2647, box 2387, August 1947.
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Ato secure international legal cover for resistance ﬁghters operating outside occu-
pied territory. In his report to the Secretary of State, Freeman claimed that dele-
gates from once-occupied countries looked past the practical implications of their
positions.108 This emphasis on practicality placed American perspectives very
much in line with the perspectives of those such as Martens at the Hague confer-
ences. Americans still could conceive of an occupier who accepted the norm of
contained war. For many Europeans, however, the Second World War had made
this a fantasy. Yet for some colonial powers at the conference already embroiled
in a range of wars with colonial resistance movements, such as France, another
ﬁction had to be maintained. That ﬁction was that the nineteenth-century civili-
zational distinction between rules for colonial wars and wars within the realm of
“civilization” could be continued in spite of the experience of the Second World
War within Europe.
Another preparatory conference in 1948 in Stockholm saw similar conﬂicts
over resistance. The US delegation suggested that all ﬁghters who surrendered
after hostilities ended, including resistance ﬁghters, would not be considered
POWs.109 In contrast, countries such as Denmark wanted resistance ﬁghters ac-
corded ofﬁcial POW status with few restrictions. Denmark’s demands in this re-
spect underscored the degree towhich even countries with a comparatively sparse
history of resistance were swept forward by a resistance myth to advocate for the
rights of resistance to occupation. Conservative Danish newspapers complained
that the great powers at Stockholm failed to grasp how war had changed. These
powers showed “ingratitude” for resistance movements’ contributions to the war
through their insistence that resistance movements fulﬁll a range of requirements
for belligerent status.110
At Geneva in 1949, these conﬂict lines resurfaced. Britain insisted that resis-
tance ﬁghters wanting POW status had to fulﬁll stringent requirements. It de-
manded that resistance movements maintain control of territory, keep in constant
communications with outside powers as well as governments-in-exile, and have
a ﬁxed headquarters. The last requirement surpassed what the Americans envi-
sioned as necessary.111 The British vision of resistance hardly accorded with108 NARA, Conﬁdential Report from Albert Clattenburg to the Secretary of State,
514.2 Geneva/8-2647, box 2387, August 26, 1947.
109 NARA, “Report of the United States Delegation to the Seventeenth International
Red Cross Conference at Stockholm,” 514.2 Stockholm/8-3486, box 2390, August 1948.
110 NARA, Telegram from the American Embassy in Copenhagen to the Department
of State, 514.2 Stockholm/9-948, box 2390, September 9, 1948.
111 NARA, Ofﬁce of the Legal Advisor, Records Relating to the Red Cross and Ge-
neva Conventions, 1941–67, British Embassy in Washington to the Department of State,
“Geneva Conference for the Protection of War Victims: Record of a Discussion be-
tween Sir Robert Craigie, Messrs. Harrison, Yingling, and McMahon,” February 28,
1949, box 6.
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Athe conditions of resistance in most occupied countries, but it ﬁt with British vi-
sions of wartime resistance in Europe. The British delegate, William Gardner,
maintained that for resistanceﬁghters to qualify as POWs, a resistancemovement
needed to exert “effective control” over a portion of occupied territory. In thewar,
according to Gardner, “French and other resistance movements were in commu-
nications with London, and the adverse belligerents could be contacted through
the Protecting Powers.”112 Behind British demands were visions of war and oc-
cupation that drew on the norm of contained conﬂict. In wartime Italy, for exam-
ple, the British Army had been leery of wartime resistance movements, consid-
ering many partisan groups no better than armed “thugs.”113 Prior to the Geneva
Conference, British diplomats such as Sir Robert Craigie and theWar Ofﬁce em-
phasized the importance of clear divisions between civilians and combatants. Re-
sistance groups had to be “regularized” to receive POW status. The War Ofﬁce
explicitly distinguished soldiers from the “peaceful population.”114 Finally, the
British were concerned about the potential spillover effects of legalizing resis-
tance to occupation for their counterinsurgency efforts in Malaya.115
At Geneva, the United States and United Kingdom also wanted the death pen-
alty retained as an option for an occupation facing a resistance movement. Crai-
gie maintained that the death penalty was necessary for severe sabotage because
“it is the duty of the Occupying Power under international law to maintain law
and order in the occupied territory.”116 This was a clear reference to the duties of
the occupying power in Article 42 of the Hague Conventions. The American
delegate, Leland Harrison, explained that the death penalty would “be limited
to truly serious crimes.”117 If an insurgent who “murdered” occupation soldiers
was released, Harrison remarked, violence would escalate as occupation soldiers
sought “retaliation” for their comrades’ deaths.118 This demonstrated fear of how
war could escalate in a practical sense and a willingness to contain such escala-
tionwith violence. Yet, it also underscored the difﬁculty of classifying attacks on
occupation forces. Where was the line between murder and resistance?112 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol. 2, pt. A
(Bern, 1949), 241.
113 Julie Le Gac, “From Suspicious Observation to Ambiguous Collaboration: The
Allies and Italian Partisans, 1943–1944,” Journal of Strategic Studies 31 (October
2008): 725.
114 PRO, WO 163/327, “Interdepartmental Committee on the Revision of the Ge-
neva Conventions: Report of the Sub-Committee on the Deﬁnition of Partisans,” un-
dated.
115 Huw Bennett, “The Other Side of COIN: Minimum and Exemplary Force in Brit-
ish Army Counterinsurgency in Kenya,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no. 4 (De-
cember 2007): 642.
116 Final Record, vol. 2, pt. B, 425.
117 Final Record, vol. 2, pt. B, 425.
118 Final Record, vol. 2, pt. B, 426.
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AThe British and American arguments were put forth in an environment suf-
fused with the memory of the Second World War. Even Britain admitted that
“the decision to recognize the existence of irregular forces and the ﬁghting par-
tisan represented a very great advance.”119 Similarly, the Americans conceded
that resistance groups required some protection. In addition, the Americans ap-
proached the question of future war and occupation differently than the British,
at least in a military sense. The Geneva Conventions and regulations for occu-
pation remained a side issue for the United States given that it still conﬁdently
relied on its nuclear weapons monopoly. Even after that monopoly disappeared
in August 1949, nuclear weapons and air power dominated the US approach to
war.120 By contrast, a dramatically weakened Britain faced a range of insurgen-
cies bubbling across its overextended empire after 1945 whose similarity to re-
sistance movements in Europe was difﬁcult to deny.
The baseline assumption ofmost European delegations at Genevawas that war
would be uncontained. Carving out categories of protection within an uncon-
tained conﬂict was the only way to make war humane. The overwhelming ma-
jority of European delegates, from France to Greece to the Soviet Union, felt that
any attempts to restrict POW status for resistance ﬁghters were veiled efforts to
place them in legal no-man’s land, deny them international legal protections, and
expose them to the violence of occupation forces.
This made it essential that resistance righters be accorded POW status at Ge-
neva with few restrictions. The French delegate, Albert Lamarle, condemned
British insistence that resistance movements maintain communications with a
governmental body outside an occupied territory. That would allow the occupier
to cut communications and “declare . . . the partisans . . . outside the scope of the
Convention.”121 The Belgian and Danish delegates “emphasized the importance
of affording effective protections to members of resistance movements.”122 The
Italian delegate explained that “it might happen . . . that while actually under en-
emy occupation, a population would rise against the Occupying Power without119 Final Record, vol. 2, pt. A, 242. Another British delegate admitted that “persons
belonging to organized resistance movements must be protected.” See Final Record,
vol. 2, pt. B, 428. Mexico, untouched by the war, felt the need to voice its understanding
of “suffering endured by the civilian populations in the occupied territories.” See Final
Record, vol. 2, pt. B, 306.
120 Ingo Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited
War, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, KS, 2008), 18–20; Marc Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wast-
ing Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954,” Interna-
tional Security 13, no. 3 (December 1988): 5–49.
121 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol. 2, pt. A
(Bern, 1949), 241.
122 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol. 2, pt. A
(Bern, 1949), 242.
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Abeing organized as a resistance movement.” Such a case occurred in Naples in
1944, the Italian delegate maintained, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949
could not exclude such a population from its purview. As individuals they might
satisfy the conditions for belligerent status, but the requirements for the organi-
zations they belonged to might deny them such status.123
The experience of occupation transcended Cold War boundaries. France, the
Soviet Union, and Greece, to name just a few, were countries with highly con-
ﬂicted experiences of resistance. Despite their ideological differences, together
they helped ensure POW status for resistance members with minimal restric-
tions. Thus, the Soviet Union expressed its concern about British attempts to
limit Geneva protections soon after Western European countries raised similar
issues. The British attempt, the Soviet delegate contended, “could not but weaken
the legal protection given to organizations which had out of patriotism taken up
arms to defend the honor and the independence of their country.”124 Eventually,
any qualiﬁcations for resistance movements were dropped with the exception
of the four pre-occupation qualiﬁcations for belligerents in the 1899 Hague Con-
ventions. The Geneva Conventions contained no mention of the Stockholm Draft
Convention requirement that a resistancemovement be attached to a belligerent in
the conﬂict and notify the occupying power of its participation. While draft con-
ventions explicitly noted the need for a resistancemovement to direct its activities
against the occupying power, the 1949 Geneva Conventions omitted this. Just
who a resistance movement might direct its activities against, the occupying
forces or the local government that remained in place during an occupation,
was left open. British and American efforts came to naught. The key article in
this respect was Article 4 of the Treatment Relative to Prisoners of War. It ex-
tended prisoner of war status to: “members of other militias and members of
other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, be-
longing to a Party to the conﬂict and operating in or outside their own territory,
even if this territory is occupied.”125
Geneva completed the turn against the norm of contained war and with it the
law of occupation. For postwar Europe, the international legal realmwas the per-
fect arena in which to seal memories of resistance and its legitimacy. The broad,
abstract legal categories that many argued were unpractical on the ground skirted
past the complicated histories of resistance movements while retroactively legit-123 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol. 2, pt. A
(Bern, 1949), 239.
124 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol. 2, pt. A
(Bern, 1949), 242.
125 Geneva Convention, Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Article 4, August 12, 1949, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/375-590007
?OpenDocument.
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Aimating the memory of “resistance.” Abstract categories, as Sarah Farmer noted
in her study of the German destruction of Oradour-sur-Glane, were effective in
eliding the conﬂicted politics of resistance in France.126 Legalizing resistance
to occupation in the international legal arena also exported tension-fraught inter-
nal political issues to a similarly abstract and safe realm.127 Yet, the ease with
which such internal issues were exported to the international legal realmwas also
indicative of theway inwhich the experience of thewar had fractured some of the
shared assumptions of that realm from the nineteenth century. For the memory of
the war with regard to occupation could also be read as something that broke
down the distinction between “civilization,”with its world of contained conﬂict,
and the world outside “civilization” that had been exposed to the uncontained
warfare of European armies. As Devin Pendas has argued, World War II made
Europeans both the purveyors of uncontained violence that they normally attrib-
uted to barbarians outside the realm of civilization and the victims of the very
same untrammeled violence that had once been conﬁned to theworld outside civ-
ilization.128 That artiﬁcial distinction dividing the world into two parts became
unsustainable, and as a result some of the classical assumptions of nineteenth-
century international law were undermined.
The ground had shifted from an acceptance of a norm of contained war and,
with it, a law of occupation that reinforced that norm. In this sense, it is interest-
ing to note the silences of the Geneva Conference compared with the outcomes
of the Hague Conference ﬁfty years earlier. The role of the local administration
in a country under military occupation was not mentioned. Gonewere the Hague
debates about the moment of “effective occupation” as well as the “duty of obe-
dience” on the part of the occupied population.129 Such debates had ﬁgured
prominently at The Hague because the notions of contained war that delegates
shared demanded that ﬁghting cease with themoment of occupation. The careful126 Sarah Farmer,Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-
sur-Glane (Berkeley, CA, 1999), 57–58.
127 Martin Conway, The Sorrows of Belgium: Liberation and Political Reconstruc-
tion, 1944–1947 (Oxford, 2012), 223, 384.
128 Devin Pendas, “‘The Magical Scent of the Savage’: Colonial Violence and the
Origins of the Legalist Paradigm of War,” Boston College International and Compara-
tive Law Review 30 (Winter 2007): 29–53.
129 In a post-Geneva article, Richard Baxter argued that the “duty of obedience” was
no longer applicable to occupation and was not lodged in international law. See Richard
R. Baxter, “The Duty of Obedience to the Belligerent Occupant,” British Yearbook of
International Law 27 (1950): 266. Others argued that the “duty of obedience” still rested
in international law. See Pertti Joenniemi and Adam Roberts, “Civil Resistance and the
Law of Military Occupations,” Instant Research on Peace and Violence 4, no. 1 (1974):
42; Sibylle Scheipers, Unlawful Combatants: The Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter
(Oxford, 2015), 101.
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Abalance between the maintenance of sovereignty, an occupation based on the
continued functioning of the local administration, and the requirement that war
and resistance cease in return for the occupier maintaining law and order was
no longer an object of concern.War, theGenevaConventions of 1949 conﬁrmed,
would continuewith occupation and receive international legal sanction. TheGe-
neva Conventions certainly did not legalize uncontained conﬂict, but they ac-
cepted the near certainty of such conﬂict and worked to create islands of protec-
tion within it. As a result, resistance to occupation was legally anchored in this
new condition of war, thus legitimating a realm of conﬂict that had dominated
the Second World War in Europe.
Conclusion
The transformation of the law of occupation shows that international law should
be framed within a broad historical context. Military occupation is not a timeless
category that can be equated with conquest.130 This examination of how occu-
pation was shaped and reshaped offers insights into not only narratives of inter-
national law in the 1940s but also how international law and memory intersect
and Europe’s role in the international construction of war.
Examining occupation reveals a different trajectory for international law in
the 1940s. Recent treatments of the 1940s split it into a decade whose “lawless”
ﬁrst half was supplanted by a “lawful” second half. That lawful second half
stems from a human rights–centered reading of late nineteenth-century interna-
tional legal projects or documents such as the Atlantic Charter.131 The Hostages
Trial and the American or British positions at Geneva and its preparatory con-
ferences revealed that late nineteenth-century international law and the norm
of contained war continued to hold sway in spite of National Socialist Germany’s
assault on both. In this sense, we can connect these continued attachments to a
longing among some to return to the prewar certainties that the war had so badly
damaged. This moving back to the past even encompassed turns toward human
rights. Samuel Moyn has maintained, for example, that the German historian
Gerhard Ritter’s interest in human rights derived from Ritter’s belief in their his-
toric Christian frame as opposed to a belief in human rights as part of a progres-
sive, Enlightenment-centered vision for the future.132130 See, e.g., David Day, Conquest: How Societies Overwhelm Others (New York,
2008).
131 This would be one way to read Elizabeth Borgwardt’s work on the Roosevelt ad-
ministration and international law. See Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World:
America’s Vision of Human Rights (Cambridge, MA, 2005).
132 Samuel Moyn, “The First Historian of Human Rights,” American Historical Re-
view 116, no. 1 (February 2011): 58–79.
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AThe history of memory is rarely brought into the same frame as the history of
international law. Yet, in this article we see how a powerful memory of the Sec-
ond World War helped undermine the norm of contained conﬂict and, by exten-
sion, the law of occupation. Frequently, international legal scholars describe the
Geneva Conventions as a logical consequence of the Second World War. Yet,
the European resistance countries at Geneva were driven forward by a particu-
lar memory of the war experience, not a simple reﬂection of that experience. As
Tony Judt and Henry Rousso argued, that memory emphasized mass resistance
to occupation along with a reluctance to excavate conﬂicted histories of socie-
ties under National Socialist occupation.133 In neither Western nor Eastern Eu-
rope was the Holocaust central to this memory. The continued postwar assertion
of occupation law as codiﬁed at The Hague with its hostility toward resistance
jeopardized the European memory of resistance. In this sense, the Geneva Con-
ventions should be considered not only another step in international law’s pro-
gressive codiﬁcation but also something that deﬁnitively sealed Europe’s mem-
ory of the Second World War.
But Geneva no longer existed in the restricted world of European international
law. TheEurocentric world of theHagueConference of 1899 had passed. Geneva
was part of an international legal project that now covered the entire globe, while
the “civilizational” distinctions of the late nineteenth century were shredded by
the experience of the Second World War itself. The irony was that the memory
of a very European part of the Second World War was the basis for remaking
the law of war for the world. The similarity between resistance in the Second
World War and colonial insurgencies could hardly escape anyone at Geneva.
To legalize resistance to occupation in Europe and then turn against colonial re-
sistance movements went too far because of the essential military similarity be-
tween the two. Moreover, the civilizational distinction that had divided the
nineteenth-century world and separated the assumptions of military occupation
from colonial warfare had collapsed. It turn, this helped create a different context
for postcolonial wars, as weakened European states attempted to retain far-ﬂung
colonies. Great Britain slowed its ratiﬁcation of the Geneva Conventions believ-
ing this would place its brutal repression of the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya in a
legal netherworld, and it also studiously avoided any mention of war in Kenya,
preferring to call it an emergency.134 It had earlier hoped, explained a BritishArmy133 Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944
(Cambridge,MA, 1991); Tony Judt,Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (NewYork,
2005), 808–9.
134 Bennett, “The Other Side of COIN,” 641–44; Caroline Elkins, Britain’s Gulag:
The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (London, 2005), 126–29. Recent studies question
the iconic status of the British response to the Malayan Emergency as a model for a “min-
imal force” approach to counterinsurgency. See David French, The British Way in Counter-
Insurgency, 1945–1967 (Oxford, 2011); PaulDixon, “‘Hearts andMinds’?British Counter-
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Aofﬁcial, “that no endeavor would be made to argue that the Convention should
apply to the operations now in progress in Malaya.”135 Yet, the legal legitimacy
conferred upon resistance to occupation in interstate war inevitably bestowed
legitimacy on internal “insurgencies.” This also threatened newly decolonized
countries. Burma vehemently opposed the application of the general articles of
the Geneva Conventions to internal conﬂicts. Applying the Geneva Conventions
to “armed conﬂicts not of an international character,” the Burmese delegate in
Geneva explained, would “give legal status to insurgents who sought by undem-
ocratic methods, to overthrow a legally constituted government by force of arms.”
This was “a very serious danger to sovereignty.”136 This reﬂected how “sover-
eignty,” not necessarily “rights,” became the dominant concern of decolonialized
countries, as Samuel Moyn has argued.137
The nineteenth-century European construction of war emphasized contained
conﬂict with a corresponding stress on legitimating conﬂict between uniformed
armies acting as representatives of states. But Geneva gave legal sanction to a
type of war that cut against the norm of contained conﬂict in the nineteenth-
century sense. It is no accident that insurgency and counterinsurgency came to
the fore after 1949. Counterinsurgency moved increasingly into the institutional
center of the American Army by the early 1960s.138 At the same time, the exem-
plary terror of the nineteenth-centuryEuropean colonial varietywas no longer ac-
ceptable, though theBritish escaped the stain of this inMalaya through hiding the
violence of their counterinsurgency effort from the broader Cold War public.139
The perception that the British fought counterinsurgencies through a “hearts and
minds” approach was reinforced through the contrast with the massive American
conventional military effort in Vietnam.140 France had its own set of problems.
The old civilizational distinctions no longer applied, and efforts to argue thatInsurgency from Malaya to Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (June 2009):
353–81; Karl Hack, “TheMalayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” Jour-
nal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 3 (June 2009): 383–414.
135 PRO, WO 32/13616, Cabinet Meeting Minutes, “Revision of the Geneva Con-
ventions of War Victims,” December 2, 1949.
136 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, vol. 2, pt. B (Bern,
1949), 15.
137 Moyn, The Last Utopia, 84–119.
138 The army emphasized counterinsurgency, in spite of arguments that the army mis-
understood it. See Andrew Krepenivich, The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore, MD, 1988),
53–55.
139 On this exemplary terror in northwest India, see, e.g., Mark Condos and Gavin
Rand, “Coercion and Conciliation at the Edge of Empire: State-Building and Its Limits
in Waziristan, 1849–1914,” Historical Journal (October 2017): 7.
140 Thompson posed the two cases against one another in his classic work on insur-
gency. See Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Les-
sons of Malaya and Vietnam, Studies in International Security, vol. 10 (New York, 1966).
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Apostcolonial conﬂicts in places like Indochina and Algeria were internal ones to
which the Geneva Conventions did not apply seemed increasingly fraught.141 In-
surgents were now legitimate combatants, framed their conﬂicts partially within
the terms ofGeneva as “resistance” to foreign occupation, and engaged in sophis-
ticated public media efforts for a ColdWar international public, asMatthew Con-
nelly has shown in the case of Algeria.142 For the FrenchArmy, this necessitated a
new, not necessarily less violent form of war, to face what it called guerre révo-
lutionnaire. Wars fought under the inﬂuence of such theories demanded a sophis-
ticatedmixture of coercion, development programs, and public relations efforts. A
focus on schools, women’s rights, and health care was embedded in such an ap-
proach to war, but it was usually overwhelmed by its more punitive elements, as
the institutionalized torture that the French Army practiced in Algeria showed.143 In
contrast to occupation’s concern with sealing war off from the populace, French
advocates of guerre révolutionnaire explicitly constructed war as taking place
within the population.
The United States looked dubiously at European efforts to twin development
programs with counterinsurgency, as shown by skeptical American attitudes to-
ward French efforts to repackage their war in Indochina from this perspective.144
Only the United States and the Soviet Union, countries with the capacity and
power to interweave expansive “development” programswith counterinsurgency,
could commit to insurgency-centered conﬂicts—although, as the Vietnam War
showed, the success of such superpower-driven efforts was hardly guaranteed.
That new landscape of global conﬂict was not the product of an inevitable pro-
cess, nor was it the result of a new “chosen” form of war on the part of global
powers or new movements of colonial liberation. It was not a product of a shift
in military strategies or tactics. It was a consequence of the new condition of war
brought about by the contingency-ﬁlled collapse of the norm of contained war
and the transformation of occupation law at Geneva. The law of military occupa-
tion as codiﬁed in the Hague Conventions was deﬁnitively undermined. A future
of uncontained conﬂict beckoned.141 Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence: The Wars of
Independence in Kenya and Algeria, trans. Dona Geyer (Philadelphia, 2013), 120–25.
142 Matthew James Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Indepen-
dence and the Origins of the Post–Cold War Era (Oxford, 2002), 230.
143 Christopher Craddock andM. L. R. Smith, “‘No Fixed Values’: A Reinterpretation
of the Theory of Guerre Revolutionnaire and the Battle of Algiers, 1956–1957,” Journal
of Cold War Studies 9, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 68–105; Moritz Feichtinger and Stephan
Malinkowski, “KonstruktiveKriege?: Rezeption undAdaption derDekolonisationskriege
in westlichen Demokratien,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 37, no. 2 (April–June 2011):
275–90.
144 Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of Amer-
ica’s Vietnam (New York, 2012).
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